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Summary
2ne of lawmakers’ highest health-related priorities
is adding a prescription drug benefit to Medicare. Al-
though that program gives older Americans broad insur-
ance coverage for many health needs, it provides only
limited coverage of drugs not dispensed during a hospital
stay. That gap in coverage has become increasingly
significant as prescription drugs have assumed greater
importance in the treatment of disease and as spending
for outpatient prescription drugs has soared.
Designing a Medicare drug benefit is a complex task,
however. The competing goals for such a benefit mean
that policymakers must make trade-offs (such as between
broad coverage or widespread enrollment and cost). They
must consider many different design elements and how
those elements might interact. And they must try to avoid
various problems that arise in creating such a benefit.
Ultimately, the choices that designers make will affect not
only the cost of the benefit but a host of other factors,
such as demand for and prices of prescription drugs,
spending by other federal and state programs, and how
various parts of the market for health insurance operate.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has had to
wrestle with those issues in recent years to produce cost
estimates of the various Medicare drug proposals debated
in the Congress. This study summarizes the main design
choices facing policymakers and explores the implications
of those choices for cost and coverage. To illustrate the
effect of those choices on cost, it also discusses CBO’s
cost estimates for four proposals that represent a broad
array of designs for a Medicare drug benefit.
For the sake of simplicity, this study focuses on a stand-
alone drug benefit—one that would be a freestanding
addition to Medicare rather than part of a broad effort to
restructure the program. Broad reform proposals raise
important policy issues but ones that are beyond the
scope of this analysis.
Higher Drug Costs and Declining
Coverage Are Spurring Calls
for a Medicare Drug Benefit
Spending for prescription drugs is the fastest growing
segment of U.S. health care costs. And Medicare benefi-
ciaries (people who are 65 or older or disabled) account
for a disproportionate share of that spending:  about 40
percent, although they make up less than 15 percent of
the U.S. population. CBO expects Medicare beneficiaries’
drug costs to rise rapidly over the next decade (even with-
out adding a drug benefit to Medicare)—at a per-benefi-
ciary rate of 10.1 percent a year, on average. That rate is
much faster than the projected growth of spending for
current Medicare benefits, and more than twice as fast as
the expected per capita growth of the U.S. economy. 
This year, Medicare beneficiaries will use a total of almost
$87 billion in outpatient prescription drugs. That figure
is projected to rise to more than $128 billion by 2005,
the earliest year that Medicare could probably begin im-
plementing a drug benefit that was enacted in 2002.
Although most Medicare beneficiaries use some prescrip-
tion drugs, that spending is concentrated among a rela-
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tively small part of the Medicare population: people with
chronic conditions requiring long-term drug therapy.
Only 17 percent of Medicare beneficiaries will spend
more than $5,000 on prescription drugs in 2005, CBO
estimates, but their combined spending will make up
nearly 54 percent of total drug expenditures by Medicare
beneficiaries that year.
Roughly one-quarter of Medicare beneficiaries have no
prescription drug coverage (as of 1999, the most recent
year for which data are available). Thus, they must pay all
of their drug costs out of pocket. The other three-quarters
obtain drug coverage as part of a plan that supplements
Medicare’s benefits. But those supplemental plans differ
greatly in the extent of coverage they provide. And recent
trends suggest that the availability and comprehensiveness
of supplemental drug coverage may be declining. Many
employment-based health plans for retirees have been
scaling back drug benefits in the face of rising costs. The
same is true of managed care plans that participate in the
Medicare+Choice program, some of which offer drug
coverage as an additional benefit.
Medicare beneficiaries who have drug coverage had an
average of about 32 prescriptions filled in 1999. The one-
quarter of Medicare beneficiaries without drug coverage
used fewer prescription drugs that year—but still had an
average of 25 prescriptions filled. Medicare beneficiaries
who lack drug coverage tend to be people in the low to
middle part of the income distribution. People with
higher income are more likely to have employment-based
plans or individually purchased medigap policies (which
charge high premiums for drug coverage). People with the
lowest income qualify for drug benefits from Medicaid or
from state-sponsored pharmaceutical assistance programs.
Proposals that would target Medicare drug coverage to-
ward low- to middle-income beneficiaries who are not
eligible for Medicaid would concentrate new federal
spending on those least likely to have drug coverage now.
Broad-based proposals, by contrast, would tend to replace
coverage that three-fourths of beneficiaries now get from
private and nonfederal sources with Medicare-funded
coverage. CBO expects that broad-based proposals for a
Medicare drug benefit would redistribute some drug fi-
nancing from employers and states to Medicare.
Design Choices for a Medicare Drug
Benefit Must Balance Competing
Objectives
Policymakers cite various goals for a Medicare prescrip-
tion drug benefit, some of which may be incompatible.
Those goals include making sure that all Medicare benefi-
ciaries have access to drug coverage, offering coverage that
is relatively comprehensive and that reimburses some
share of costs for most enrollees, providing insurance pro-
tection for elderly people who have the highest drug
spending, ensuring that enrollees’ premiums are afford-
able, and limiting the cost to the federal government.
A Medicare drug benefit could require substantial federal
spending, especially if the government subsidized a large
share of the costs for many enrollees. Medicare beneficia-
ries are expected to spend an average of nearly $2,500
apiece on outpatient prescription drugs next year, and
access to better drug coverage would undoubtedly stimu-
late further spending. However, policymakers could exac-
erbate or alleviate the federal cost burden through their
decisions about the design of the benefit.
How Comprehensive Will the Benefit Be?
The most important factor determining the cost of a
Medicare drug benefit is the scope and structure of its
coverage. Choices about coverage include: 
 The deductible amount—whether coverage begins
with an enrollee’s first dollar of drug spending in a
given year or after the deductible amount is reached;
 Cost-sharing rates—what part of the cost of a prescrip-
tion is the responsibility of the enrollee;
 The benefit cap—the level of spending beyond which
the enrollee must pay the full cost of each prescription;
and
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 The catastrophic stop-loss amount—the level of
spending beyond which the enrollee pays little or noth-
ing for prescriptions.
The possible variations on those choices are endless.
Some combinations could produce Medicare drug bene-
fits unlike anything available in the private sector today.
(For example, many of the recent Medicare proposals en-
vision a hole in coverage: a spending level between the
benefit cap and the stop-loss amount at which enrollees
would have no drug coverage. Employment-based drug
plans almost never include such holes.)
The benefit structure would affect the cost of the Medi-
care drug program not only directly but also indirectly,
through the out-of-pocket expenses it would require of
enrollees. For instance, benefits with low cost-sharing
rates would encourage those enrollees who were newly
shielded from paying the full cost of a prescription to use
more—and more expensive—drugs.
Who Will Be Eligible to Enroll?  
Choices about eligibility include whether the prescription
drug benefit would be available to all Medicare beneficia-
ries or only to some (such as those with low income, few
assets, or no current drug coverage). Another key decision
is whether to make enrollment in the drug benefit volun-
tary and, if so, with what restrictions. If the benefit was
voluntary and did not limit when and how often eligible
people could enroll, Medicare beneficiaries would tend to
sign up (and pay premiums) only when they expected to
incur high drug costs; they would opt out again when
they foresaw little need for prescription drugs. As a result,
the cost of the program per participant would be higher
than if people had to enroll and pay premiums for a
longer period of time.
How Much Will the Government Subsidize?
To what extent will the government pay enrollees’ costs
for premiums or prescriptions? And will those subsidies
vary with enrollees’ income? Those design choices affect
not only federal spending but also spending by state and
local governments, which help pay the drug costs of some
low-income elderly people through Medicaid and other
programs. In addition, the level of subsidy offered to
Medicare beneficiaries would have an important effect on
people’s willingness to enroll in the drug program.
How Will the Benefit Be Administered? 
Almost all of the recent proposals for a Medicare drug
benefit envision using organizations such as pharmacy
benefit managers (PBMs) to administer the benefit—an
approach that is common in the private sector. Critical
choices, however, are the number of such organizations
that would serve a region, the restrictions they would be
subject to, the basis on which they could compete for
enrollees, and whether they would assume any insurance
risk (that is, be liable for any costs that were not fully cov-
ered by enrollees’ premiums or federal reimbursements).
In examining prescription drug proposals, CBO has con-
cluded that certain administrative features offer the great-
est opportunity to control federal costs and total spending
on outpatient prescription drugs. Those features are al-
lowing benefit managers to employ the full array of cost-
management tools now available to private-sector drug
plans, forcing benefit managers to compete among them-
selves for enrollees’ business, and making managers as-
sume financial risk for delivering benefits.
Benefit Designs Must Address
Multiple Problems
In making the design choices described above, policy-
makers need to consider several problems inherent in
creating a Medicare drug benefit. Those problems include
the possibility that the coverage will mainly attract people
with the highest drug costs, the need to limit costs to the
government and to enrollees, the ability and willingness
of private entities (such as health insurers and PBMs) to
administer the drug benefit, and the possible impact of
the benefit on other parts of the Medicare program.
Adverse Selection
A stand-alone prescription drug benefit could be espe-
cially prone to the insurance-market phenomenon known
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as adverse selection, in which people who expect to have
higher-than-average costs disproportionately enroll in an
insurance plan. Adverse selection can occur when plans
(or potential enrollees) make decisions based on the desire
to avoid attracting (or being grouped with) enrollees who
are likely to have expensive claims. For example, health
insurers can design their coverage or market their plans in
ways that will be especially attractive to relatively healthy
people. And potential enrollees who would rather not be
in an insurance pool with people who are likely to have
high costs—because that would imply higher premiums
than would otherwise be the case—may opt out of insur-
ance altogether.
Adverse selection is a problem because it undermines the
purpose of insurance, which is to spread financial risks
among a wide pool of people. Adverse selection raises the
cost of insurance for people who do enroll. And it makes
people who are discouraged from enrolling worse off by
not receiving the benefits of insurance. (Even people who
expect to have low medical costs could benefit from in-
suring against the possibility that they develop a serious
illness.)  The outcome of adverse selection can be a pat-
tern of high premiums and low enrollment, resulting in
much less coverage than would exist otherwise.
Two kinds of adverse selection could affect the operation
of a Medicare drug benefit: adverse selection into the
drug program as a whole; and, if multiple plans are al-
lowed to administer the drug benefit in the same region
and bear financial risk for the cost of the benefit, adverse
selection among those plans.
Adverse Selection into the Drug Program. If relatively
healthy Medicare beneficiaries (such as those with no
chronic conditions) tended to opt out of Medicare drug
coverage, costs and premiums would be higher for people
who did enroll than they would be if the benefit covered
a representative mix of Medicare beneficiaries. Paradoxi-
cally, although adverse selection into the drug program
would raise costs per enrollee, it would most likely reduce
the total cost of the drug benefit, because the number of
participants would be so much smaller. Such a situation
could become unstable, however, with premiums contin-
uing to grow and enrollment continuing to drop.
The main way to prevent adverse selection into the drug
program would be to encourage as many people as possi-
ble to enroll. The government could do that through a
number of approaches:
 Requiring One-Time Enrollment. A “choose it or lose
it” policy would boost enrollment because even healthy
Medicare beneficiaries might be worried enough about
developing an expensive medical condition someday
that they would enroll in the drug benefit if they had
only one chance to do so.
 Subsidizing the Program to a Large Extent. Broad fed-
eral subsidies would mean that even fairly healthy
people would be likely to get more in benefits than
they paid in premiums.
 Risk-Rating Premiums. Adjusting the premiums that
enrollees would pay according to their risk of high
drug spending would encourage healthier people to
enroll because their costs would be lower.
 Making the Drug Benefit a Mandatory Part of Medi-
care’s Part B. If drug coverage was incorporated into
Medicare’s Supplementary Medical Insurance benefits,
even people who expected to have low drug costs
would be inclined to enroll in order to insure against
the general medical expenses they might face. 
Adverse Selection Among Drug Plans. When a prescrip-
tion drug program allows competing plans to operate and
requires them to assume financial risk for the benefits
they pay out, difficulties related to interplan adverse selec-
tion can result. That type of adverse selection occurs
when certain plans attract beneficiaries with high ex-
pected costs because their services or coverage are more
generous than are those of other plans. Drug plans would
probably react to the possibility of adverse selection by
trying to avoid enrolling people who are apt to have high
drug costs. For example, they might advertise their plans
at golf clubs but not at nursing homes. Or they might cap
benefits below the spending levels likely to be reached by
seniors with chronic health conditions, or they might
require substantial cost sharing.
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The government could employ various policy tools to
minimize interplan adverse selection: it could require
plans to offer standardized benefits or could create stan-
dardized marketing materials for all Medicare drug plans,
or it could compensate plans for their differential costs
through reinsurance or risk adjustment. In addition, as
noted above, the government could allow drug plans to
charge risk-rated premiums.
Strategies that would reduce adverse selection, however,
could create other problems. Perhaps the most significant
is that if plans were shielded from the full burden of high
spending, they would have less incentive to control costs.
Thus, reducing the risks associated with interplan adverse
selection must be weighed against plans’ incentive to con-
trol costs.
Cost Containment
Medicare spending is expected to soar over the next three
decades as the large baby-boom generation becomes eligi-
ble for the program. Adding subsidized drug coverage to
Medicare would significantly increase the federal govern-
ment’s financial commitment, particularly since Medicare
beneficiaries’ drug spending is projected to grow at
double-digit rates each year even without a drug benefit.
Thus, controlling costs is a key problem in designing such
a benefit.
The extent of the cost containment challenge depends on
the level of coverage provided. A more extensive benefit
would shift more of the burden of paying for drugs from
consumers to drug plans. In addition, by reducing out-of-
pocket costs to enrollees, a Medicare drug benefit would
stimulate demand for prescription drugs. The more gen-
erous the coverage (the lower the deductible, the required
cost sharing, and the catastrophic stop-loss amount), the
greater would be the stimulus to demand—and the
greater the burden on cost management to limit that
growth in demand.
Active cost management by the entities administering the
Medicare drug benefit could encourage the use of fewer
or less-expensive drugs. The degree to which PBMs could
effectively control Medicare drug costs would depend on
their being allowed and encouraged to aggressively use the
various tools at their disposal. Those tools include formu-
laries (lists of drugs that a health plan will cover) and
related approaches that steer demand to preferred drugs,
networks of pharmacies, disease-management programs,
and efforts to educate patients and physicians. All of those
tools, to one degree or another, work by influencing phy-
sicians’ or consumers’ choices about what drug to pre-
scribe or where to fill a prescription.
In addition, requiring benefit managers to assume some
insurance risk for the benefits they pay out and allowing
multiple entities to compete for enrollees on the basis of
premiums and reimbursements would give managers a
greater incentive to hold down spending. However, the
savings from those features would be partly offset by two
kinds of additional costs:
 The Insurance-Risk Premium. Riskier enterprises re-
quire higher dollar returns to operate than less risky
ones do, because unless investors are compensated for
bearing the extra risk, investment in those enterprises
will dry up. A design that made PBMs or other benefit
administrators bear insurance risk would impose a
higher cost on those entities than would a design that
left insurance risk in the hands of the government.
That added cost is referred to as the insurance-risk
premium.
 Plans’ Marketing Costs. Competition would introduce
additional expenses associated with marketing to and
enrolling Medicare beneficiaries, which would not
arise if a single plan administered the drug benefit in
each region. Competing plans would have to provide
specific information about their plans to beneficiaries.
If plans were also responsible for enrolling people and
collecting their premiums, the cost of carrying out
those administrative functions would be higher than
under a single-plan system.
Ways exist to keep the insurance-risk premium and mar-
keting costs in check without losing most of the savings
from a competitive system with active benefit manage-
ment. One approach would be to limit insurance risk by
providing reinsurance to plans for very high cost en-
rollees. Under one type of reinsurance mechanism, a drug
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plan would receive government funds on the basis of the
claims incurred by each of its enrollees. If an enrollee’s
claims in a year reached a specific level, the government
would pay the plan a certain fraction of the enrollee’s
additional claims costs. That fraction would increase as
the enrollee’s claims grew. With such a mechanism, plans
would still have an incentive to actively manage the drug
benefit, but they would be protected from uncontrollably
high-cost enrollees.
The extra marketing and administrative costs associated
with competition could also be reduced (though not elim-
inated) by standardizing the information given to Medi-
care beneficiaries, by having the government perform the
functions of enrolling beneficiaries and collecting premi-
ums, and by facilitating efficient marketing to prospective
enrollees.
Even the most effective benefit management, however,
would not keep the prices of some drugs from rising un-
der a Medicare drug benefit. By raising the limit on con-
sumers’ willingness or ability to pay for covered drugs, a
generous drug benefit would make newly insured patients
more tolerant of high prices. With such a benefit, if a
manufacturer developed a unique drug whose target pop-
ulation consisted mainly of Medicare beneficiaries, it
could raise the drug’s price (or, if the drug was new, enter
the market with a high launch price). Preventing very
high prices for such drugs would be difficult apart from
imposing direct price controls or threatening to deny or
delay coverage of the drug—actions that could increase
uncertainty about the market for new drugs and thus dis-
courage investment in pharmaceutical research and devel-
opment.
Fortunately, most drugs are not unique but instead face
competition from close substitutes. For such drugs, the
most likely effect of a Medicare drug benefit would be
only moderate price increases, and then only for drugs
with patent protection or exclusive marketing rights.
Nevertheless, the possibility that manufacturers of patent-
protected drugs could raise prices underscores the impor-
tance of giving benefit managers both the incentive and
the authority to use cost-management tools.
Administrative Feasibility
Some proposals would require the private organizations
charged with administering the Medicare drug benefit not
only to play the roles that PBMs do in the private sector
but also to compete for enrollees, bear insurance risk, and
cope with federal (and possibly state) regulation. An
important area of uncertainty is whether private entities
would be willing or able to participate in the Medicare
drug program under those conditions. If they were not,
the program would take longer and cost more to imple-
ment nationwide.
Private organizations could face at least three barriers to
participation. First, in order to compete as risk-bearing
entities, most PBMs would probably have to form part-
nerships with insurance companies and seek state licenses.
Alternatively, PBMs could offer their traditional benefit-
management services to insurance companies that would
provide the Medicare drug benefit. In either case, new
functional roles and relationships would need to be devel-
oped before private entities could bid to offer Medicare
drug plans. Second, plans might be reluctant to enter the
market early because of uncertainty about how competi-
tion among plans would work itself out. Especially in the
early years of the program, plans might be unable to
gauge their risk of interplan adverse selection or know
how effective their strategies to cope with such risk would
be. And third, plans would face regulatory hurdles unless
the states’ role in licensing and regulating participating
drug plans was clarified at the outset.
It is possible that only one plan or even no plans would
participate in the drug program in some areas. Without
multiple plans in a region, the full benefits of competition
would not be realized. If that happened, the government
might have to provide its own public plan as a fallback in
those areas (or offer extra financial incentives for private
plans to operate there) to ensure a competitive program
nationwide. Fallback plans would be very vulnerable to
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interplan adverse selection in any region where there was
also a risk-bearing plan. If the fallback plan was less ag-
gressive than other plans in managing costs, the govern-
ment could end up paying more, on average, in areas
requiring such direct intervention.
Impact on Other Parts of Medicare
Adding a stand-alone prescription drug benefit to Medi-
care would have ripple effects on the rest of the program.
For some seniors, greater access to outpatient prescription
drugs would improve their health, reducing their use of
hospitals and other services that Medicare now covers.
For other seniors, however, use of health care could in-
crease. For example, using a greater number of drugs
raises the probability of adverse events—such as harmful
drug interactions or side effects—which could lead to
new or longer visits to hospitals, emergency rooms, and
other health care providers. Little good evidence exists
from which to determine the net effect of drug coverage
on other Medicare services; but overall, costs for other
Medicare services would probably not change signifi-
cantly.
One part of Medicare that would most likely be affected
by the availability of a drug benefit is the Medicare+
Choice (M+C) program. Those effects would go in con-
flicting directions, however. On the one hand, the man-
aged care plans that take part in the M+C program have
historically attracted beneficiaries by offering benefits be-
yond the basic Medicare package—the most desirable of
which is prescription drug coverage. If drug coverage was
available to beneficiaries of regular fee-for-service Medi-
care, M+C plans would lose one of their principal com-
petitive advantages.
On the other hand, under a Medicare drug benefit, M+C
plans that offered drug coverage would be paid for the
value of that coverage rather than having to finance it
from their savings on administration or benefits. The
rising cost of prescription drugs and the lack of Medicare
payment for drug coverage (combined with 1997 changes
in payment rates) are reasons that M+C plans have cited
for dropping out of Medicare in recent years. Higher
payments, to cover the cost of a prescription drug benefit,
could help stabilize those plans’ participation.
Cost Estimates for Medicare Drug
Proposals Reflect the Choices Made
by Policymakers
In recent years, policymakers have offered a host of pro-
posals for a Medicare prescription drug benefit. The types
of design choices described above have a significant effect
on those proposals’ costs. Four Medicare drug proposals
introduced during the 106th Congress (1999 to 2000) are
particularly good examples of the broad spectrum of ben-
efit designs being considered and the various ways in
which a Medicare drug benefit could be administered.
Each year, when CBO updates its 10-year projections of
drug spending by or for Medicare beneficiaries, it also up-
dates its estimates for those proposals as a way to evaluate
its estimating methods and key assumptions. Those pro-
posals are the benefit described in the Clinton Adminis-
tration’s June 2000 Mid-Session Review; the Robb amend-
ment (introduced by Senator Charles Robb as amend-
ment 3598 to H.R. 4577); H.R. 4680 (introduced by
Representative William Thomas), which passed the
House of Representatives in October 2000; and Breaux-
Frist II (S. 2807, introduced by Senator John Breaux).
The original versions of those four proposals would have
introduced a Medicare drug benefit in 2002 or 2003. In
updating its estimates, CBO used the same dollar
amounts included in the original proposals but assumed
that the new Medicare drug program would begin in
2005. For example, if a proposal called for a $250 de-
ductible and a stop-loss amount of $5,000 in out-of-
pocket spending, CBO used those dollar values for 2005.
(After that, it indexed them for projected changes in per
capita drug spending through 2012, the end of the cur-
rent 10-year budget window.) Keeping the same nominal
values for the benefit’s initial deductible and stop-loss
amount while drug spending is growing tends to make
the proposals more generous than when they were intro-
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duced. However, policymakers have been reluctant to
propose a new Medicare drug benefit with higher deduct-
ibles and catastrophic stop-loss limits.
The Design of the Four Proposals
All four proposals would offer drug coverage on a volun-
tary basis as a new Part D of Medicare, but they would
give beneficiaries only a one-time opportunity to enroll
without penalty. (If beneficiaries delayed enrollment, they
would pay a penalty related to their expected benefit costs
when they signed up.) Without that provision, CBO
would assume much lower rates of enrollment and much
higher costs per enrollee for each proposal, because people
would tend to postpone signing up for the benefit until
their drug spending became relatively high.
The Clinton Administration’s Plan. The proposal in-
cluded in the Clinton Administration’s 2000 Mid-Session
Review called for a Medicare drug benefit that would have
no deductible and would pay 50 percent of an enrollee’s
drug spending up to a limit of $1,000 in 2005 (see Sum-
mary Table 1). Once a participant incurred $4,000 in
out-of-pocket costs during the year, Medicare would
cover 100 percent of further drug spending. Under the
proposal, plans would have the flexibility to vary their
enrollees’ coinsurance rates if they could demonstrate that
the lower cost sharing would not raise costs for the Medi-
care program; that is, more-generous benefits would be
offset by more-effective cost management.
The Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS)
would set a uniform national premium for the drug bene-
fit. Enrollees with income of up to 150 percent of the
federal poverty level would receive assistance in paying
their premiums; those with income of up to 135 percent
of the poverty level would also get help in paying their
cost-sharing amounts. In addition, Medicare would offer
a subsidy to employment-based health plans to encourage
them to remain the primary payer for their retirees’ drug
coverage. (That subsidy would equal 67 percent of the
amount that Medicare would have paid if a plan’s retirees
had enrolled in the Part D benefit.)
With those provisions, the general federal subsidy for all
enrollees would equal 50 percent of “premium costs” (the
total value of the benefits paid out plus the cost of admin-
istering the drug program) below the stop-loss limit. That
subsidy would be 100 percent above the limit.
 
Under the Clinton Administration’s proposal, PBMs or
other entities would compete to be the sole Medicare
drug plan in each geographic area for a specified period of
time. PBMs would not bear insurance risk for their en-
rollees’ drug spending, and they would face restrictions
on the cost-management approaches they could use. For
example, they would have to set dispensing fees high
enough to ensure participation by most retail pharmacies.
In addition, enrollees would be guaranteed access to any
drug that the prescribing physician certified as medically
necessary.
The Robb Amendment. Unlike the other proposals exam-
ined in this study, the Robb amendment would not cap
an enrollee’s benefits. Under that amendment, enrollees
would pay a $250 deductible and graduated coinsurance
rates—50 percent until their annual out-of-pocket drug
spending reached $3,500, then 25 percent until their out-
of-pocket spending reached $4,000. After that, Medicare
would cover all of their additional drug spending. The
entities selected to administer the benefit would be al-
lowed to waive the deductible for generic drugs and to
lower beneficiaries’ coinsurance rates if they could show
that the lower cost sharing would be offset by effective
cost management.
Like the Clinton Administration’s plan, the Robb amend-
ment would have the Secretary of HHS set a uniform
nationwide premium. The proposal would also provide
low-income subsidies to cover premiums and cost sharing
for enrollees with income of up to 135 percent of the
poverty level and premium assistance for people with
income of up to 150 percent of the poverty level. The
Robb amendment would offer the same subsidy as the
Clinton proposal to employment-based health plans if
they remained the primary source of drug coverage for
their retirees. The general subsidy for all enrollees would
equal 50 percent of premium costs.
Unlike the Clinton Administration’s proposal, however,
the Robb amendment envisions a competitive system,
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Provisions of Four Prescription Drug Proposals for Medicare
Clinton
Mid-Session 
Review Plan
Robb
Amendment H.R. 4680
Breaux-
Frist II
Benefit Amounts (Dollars)a
Deductible None 250 250 250
Benefit cap 1,000 None 1,050 1,050
Stop-loss amount 4,000 4,000 6,000 6,000
Benefit Administrator SSA SSA Plans SSA
Subsidies for Employment-Based
Health Plans Yes Yes Nob Nob
Number of Plans in Each Region One At least two At least two At least two
Plans Bear Insurance Risk No No Yes Yes
Federal Subsidy for All Enrolleesc 50% subsidy of
premium costs
below stop-loss
amount; 100% above
50% subsidy of 
premium costs
No subsidy of
premium costs;
graduated 
reinsurance rate, 
averaging 35%d
25% subsidy of
premium costs
below stop-loss
amount; 80%
reinsurance above
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Note: SSA = Social Security Administration.
a. The amounts that would apply in the Medicare drug benefit’s first year of operation, which is assumed to be calendar year 2005.
b. Employment-based health plans for retirees could participate as entities that provide a Medicare drug plan, with the same federal subsidy as other plans.
However, no attempt was made to estimate what share of total enrollment in the drug benefit they would account for.
c. “Premium costs” refers to the total value of the benefits paid out plus the cost of administering the drug program.
d. Today, the enrollee spending levels specified in H.R. 4680 at which federal reinsurance would be paid would lead to a federal subsidy of more than 35 percent.
However, the legislative language caps that subsidy at 35 percent.  Thus, the spending levels at which the federal government paid reinsurance would need to be
raised.
with at least two entities (selected through competitive
bidding) administering the drug benefit in each region.
Those entities would not bear insurance risk for their
enrollees’ drug spending. They would also have fewer
explicit restrictions on the tools they could employ to
control drug spending than under the Clinton plan. For
example, PBMs could use restrictive formularies, subject
to rules set by a national committee. However, they
would have to provide any drug approved for marketing
in the United States if it was medically necessary for a
patient (as established through procedures set by the
PBM).
H.R. 4680. This proposal, which the House of Represen-
tatives passed in October 2000 but the Senate did not
consider, also envisioned a drug benefit with a $250 de-
ductible. Medicare would pay 50 percent of participants’
drug costs, up to a cap of $1,050 in the first year of the
benefit. Once enrollees incurred out-of-pocket costs of
$6,000 or more during the year, Medicare would cover
100 percent of their drug spending. H.R. 4680 would
allow participating plans to offer actuarially equivalent
versions of the standard benefit—subject to certain limits.
Multiple plans would compete for enrollees in each re-
gion on the basis of premiums, access to drugs, and qual-
ity of services (once they were approved by the agency
administering the program through a process of negotia-
tion). Unlike the two proposals discussed above, H.R.
4680 would require those plans to assume significant
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insurance risk. It would also allow them to use a broad
array of tools to control their enrollees’ drug spending.
The federal government would ensure that at least two
plans were available in each area, one of which could be a
Medicare+Choice plan offering drug coverage. Employ-
ment-based health plans for retirees would also be eligible
to participate directly as entities themselves. In any area
not served by at least two plans, Medicare would have
authority to provide financial incentives (such as a partial
underwriting of risk) to encourage plans to operate in that
region.
Rather than having one nationwide premium set by
Medicare, H.R. 4680 would allow entities to set their
own premiums. As a result, premiums would vary geo-
graphically and among plans. Low-income subsidies
would cover premiums and cost-sharing expenses for
enrollees with income of up to 135 percent of the poverty
level (except that those enrollees would be responsible for
covering any spending in the hole between the benefit cap
and the stop-loss amount). Enrollees with income of up
to 150 percent of the poverty level would be eligible for
assistance with their premiums.
Unlike in the other proposals, the federal government
would not provide an across-the-board subsidy of each
plan’s premium. Instead, it would make reinsurance pay-
ments to plans for the spending of very high cost en-
rollees. In total, those payments would amount to 35
percent of the cost of benefits paid out under the drug
program.
Breaux-Frist II. This proposal has the exact same benefit
structure as H.R. 4680 and a similar subsidy for low-
income enrollees. However, its provisions for the general
federal subsidy for all enrollees differ. Whereas H.R. 4680
would provide all of that subsidy through individual rein-
surance payments for high-cost enrollees, Breaux-Frist II
would subsidize 25 percent of premium costs below the
$6,000 catastrophic stop-loss limit and then cover 80
percent of benefits above that limit through individual
reinsurance.
Multiple risk-bearing plans would offer the benefit in
each region, and premiums could vary geographically and
among plans. In addition, PBMs would have the same
incentives and authority to manage costs under this pro-
posal that they would have under H.R. 4680. However,
unlike in H.R. 4680, the Social Security Administration
would administer enrollment and collect premiums. As a
result, plans’ marketing and enrollment costs would be
lower under this proposal than under H.R. 4680.
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Federal Costs of Four Prescription Drug Proposals, 2005-2012
(By fiscal year, in billions of dollars)
Clinton
Mid-Session
Review Plan
Robb
Amendment H.R. 4680
Breaux-
Frist II
Federal Mandatory Spending on Prescription
Drug Benefits for Medicare Beneficiaries
Medicare 507 342 120 178
Other federal programsa -145 -142 -84 -78
Low-income subsidy 128 148 141 123
Other Mandatory Spending   22   27   18   10
Total 512 374 195 233
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Note: These numbers exclude a small amount of appropriated funds for federal administrative costs.
a. Principally Medicaid, the Federal Employees Health Benefits program, and the military’s Tricare for Life program. Negative numbers indicate savings.
SUMMARY xix
Range of Cost Estimates for the Four Proposals  
To estimate the costs of a proposed Medicare drug bene-
fit, CBO uses a model that simulates how that benefit
would affect the spending of a representative sample of
Medicare beneficiaries. The model contains detailed in-
formation about Medicare beneficiaries’ spending for
prescription drugs and other health services, their supple-
mental insurance coverage, their health status, and their
income. CBO’s cost estimates result from running the
model using a proposal’s total design specifications; be-
cause the various design elements affect one another, the
impact of specific design choices on costs cannot be quan-
tified independently.
Among the four proposed drug benefits examined here,
CBO estimates that the Clinton Administration’s would
have the highest costs to the federal government: a total of
$512 billion between 2005 and 2012 (see Summary
Table 2). That total reflects the federal costs of the new
Medicare benefit, including subsidies for low-income
enrollees, partly offset by federal savings in other pro-
grams, such as Medicaid, the Federal Employees Health
Benefits program, and the military’s Tricare for Life pro-
gram. The Robb amendment would rank second in fed-
eral costs, at $374 billion over the same eight-year period.
Breaux-Frist II and H.R. 4680 would cost $233 billion
and $195 billion, respectively, during the 2005-2012
period. Although those two proposals have identical bene-
fit structures, they differ in terms of the share of total
costs subsidized by the federal government. As a result,
their levels of enrollment would differ as well as their
federal costs.
The federal costs of a particular drug benefit depend
largely on the extent to which it subsidizes total drug
spending by or for Medicare beneficiaries. Thus, the
Robb and Clinton plans—which would pay 21 percent
and 29 percent, respectively, of Medicare beneficiaries’
total drug costs—would have the highest costs to Medi-
care. H.R. 4680 and Breaux-Frist II—which would pay
for 12 percent to 15 percent of total drug spending by or
for Medicare beneficiaries—would have lower costs to the
Medicare program.

Introduction
0edicare offers broad insurance protection for
many health needs of the nation’s elderly. However, it
provides very limited coverage for the costs of outpatient
prescription drugs (those not dispensed during a hospital
stay). That gap in coverage has become increasingly sig-
nificant over the past three decades for a number of rea-
sons. Prescription drugs have assumed growing impor-
tance in the treatment of disease, especially as new, more
effective—and more costly—drugs have become available
to treat chronic diseases prevalent in older people. Partly
as a result, spending for outpatient prescription drugs has
soared.
Despite Medicare’s limited drug coverage, most beneficia-
ries have not faced the full effects of that rapid rise in
spending. The reason is that roughly three-quarters of
Medicare beneficiaries have insurance coverage for outpa-
tient prescription drugs through other sources. Those
sources include private insurance plans—such as employ-
ment-based plans for retirees and medigap plans that are
specifically designed to supplement Medicare—as well as
public programs, such as Medicaid. Some managed care
plans in the Medicare+Choice program also offer drug
coverage as an extra benefit, usually for an additional
premium. In general, the Medicare beneficiaries who lack
supplemental drug coverage or who have only limited
coverage are people in the low to middle part of the
income scale.
Policymakers have shown widespread interest in provid-
ing a comprehensive drug benefit through the Medicare
program. They cite various goals for such a benefit, some
of which may be mutually incompatible:
 Ensuring that all Medicare beneficiaries have access to
drug coverage,
 Offering coverage that is relatively comprehensive and
that reimburses some costs for most enrollees,
 Providing insurance protection for elderly people with
the highest drug spending,
 Ensuring that premiums are affordable, and
 Limiting the cost to the federal government.
The extent to which particular policy goals are met will
depend largely on how the Medicare drug benefit is de-
signed. Even seemingly minor differences in specific de-
sign features can have a big impact on the drug program’s
cost to the federal government, its impact on total spend-
ing for prescription drugs, and the level of insurance pro-
tection it affords enrollees. Moreover, different design
features could have complex interactions. A clearer under-
standing of those differences and interactions would per-
mit policymakers to better balance the trade-offs inherent
in a Medicare prescription drug benefit, such as the trade-
off between higher costs and greater insurance coverage.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has grappled
with many of those issues in estimating the costs of Medi-
care drug programs proposed during the past three ses-
sions of Congress. This study summarizes the key design
choices facing policymakers and explores the implications
of those choices for cost and coverage. It also discusses
CBO’s cost estimates for four Medicare drug proposals
first introduced in 1999 or 2000 during the 106th Con-
gress. Those proposals are the one in the Clinton
Administration’s June 2000 Mid-Session Review; the Robb
amendment (introduced by Senator Charles Robb as
amendment 3598 to H.R. 4577); H.R. 4680 (introduced
by Representative William Thomas), which passed the
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House of Representatives in October 2000; and Breaux-
Frist II (S. 2807, introduced by Senator John Breaux).
Those four proposals cover a broad spectrum of ap-
proaches for delivering a Medicare drug benefit. Each
year, when CBO updates its 10-year projections of drug
spending by or for Medicare beneficiaries, it also updates
its estimates for those proposals as a way to reassess key
assumptions used in its estimating models.
One issue surrounding a prescription drug benefit is
whether it should be a freestanding addition to Medicare
(referred to as a stand-alone benefit) or part of a broad
effort to restructure the program. Some policymakers
advocate expanding Medicare benefits only as one ele-
ment of a more-sweeping reform that would change cost-
sharing rules, introduce competitive features, and add
prescription drug coverage as an integrated benefit.
U.S. demographic pressures mean that without major
changes in Medicare’s design and financing, the cost of
the program will grow dramatically over the next 30 years
as the large baby-boom generation becomes eligible for
benefits.1 At the same time, Social Security and Medicaid
will face an explosion in costs for the same reason (see Fig-
ure 1). Consequently, without significant changes, the
amount that the federal government spends on those
three programs is projected to consume a substantial por-
tion of what it now spends on the entire budget.
Broad proposals to reform Medicare raise issues that go
well beyond those raised by proposals for a stand-alone
drug benefit. This study does not address those wider
issues. Rather, it focuses on several important questions
concerning a freestanding drug benefit that would be
available to beneficiaries under the present Medicare
system, including people enrolled in fee-for-service Medi-
care or in Medicare+Choice plans. Many policy analysts
have argued that fully integrating a drug benefit into
Medicare and ensuring stable funding for the program in
the future can only be accomplished in the context of
)LJXUH 
Spending for Social Security, Medicare,
and Medicaid, 2000-2030
(Percentage of GDP)
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on its midrange assumptions about
growth of gross domestic product and program spending.  For further
details, see Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic
Outlook: Fiscal Years 2003-2012 (January 2002), Chapter 6.
comprehensive reform. Such reform is an important pol-
icy choice but is beyond the scope of this analysis.
Likewise, this study does not discuss other legislative ini-
tiatives that relate to prescription drugs but are not di-
rectly part of a Medicare drug benefit. For example, un-
der current federal law, manufacturers of brand-name
drugs that wish to have their products reimbursed by
Medicaid must give that program the best price available
to most other purchasers. If the Congress made drug
prices for Medicare exempt from that rule, so that Medi-
care’s discounts from drugmakers would not affect
Medicaid’s best price, then Medicare might be able to
negotiate even lower prices.  As a result, the cost of a
Medicare drug benefit could decline. In addition, changes
in policies governing how the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration regulates such matters as the introduction of new
drugs, promotion and advertising for prescription drugs,
or reimportation of U.S.-made drugs that were first ex-
ported to other countries at lower prices could affect the
cost of a Medicare benefit. Although policymakers might
consider initiatives in those and other areas as possible
ways to save money, each change would raise a host of
issues unrelated to a Medicare drug benefit.
1. See the statement of Dan L. Crippen, Director, Congressional
Budget Office, “Projections of Medicare and Prescription Drug
Spending,” before the Senate Committee on Finance, March 7,
2002.
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Medicare Beneficiaries’ Drug Spending
and Coverage
6 everal trends are fueling the drive to add a pre-
scription drug benefit to Medicare. Spending for pre-
scription drugs continues to be the fastest growing seg-
ment of health care costs. And although Medicare benefi-
ciaries make up nearly 15 percent of the U.S. population,
they account for about 40 percent of that spending,
which means that increases in drug costs affect them dis-
proportionately. Altogether, Medicare beneficiaries will
use nearly $87 billion of outpatient prescription drugs in
2002—an amount that is expected to grow by about 12
percent a year over the next decade (even without a drug
benefit in the Medicare program).
In terms of drug coverage, what was traditionally Medi-
care beneficiaries’ main source, employment-based health
plans for retirees, has been scaling back benefits in many
cases. An additional factor is that Medicare beneficiaries
with the highest and lowest income are more likely to
have drug coverage (private and public, respectively).
People in the low to middle part of the income scale are
less likely to have coverage; thus, they pay a higher-than-
average proportion of their drug costs from their own
pockets.
Nevertheless, the fundamental issue inherent in the
debate about adding a drug benefit to Medicare may not
be one of providing for use of prescription drugs so much
as one of redistributing the cost of drugs away from the
people, companies, and government entities that now pay
for them. Currently, about three-quarters of Medicare
beneficiaries have some kind of insurance to help defray
the cost of drugs. The remainder, who have no drug
coverage, filled an average of 25 prescriptions in 1999,
the Congressional Budget Office estimates, compared
with an average of 32 prescriptions for Medicare benefi-
ciaries who have drug coverage.
Beneficiaries’ Spending on
Prescription Drugs
In recent years, the growth of prescription drug spending
has far outpaced the growth of spending for other types of
health care. Between 1990 and 2000, for example, annual
spending on prescription drugs in the United States grew
nearly twice as fast as total national health expenditures
(which in turn grew significantly faster than the economy
during that period, and continues to do so). Moreover,
since the mid-1990s, drug spending has increased at a
double-digit rate each year.
For the U.S. population as a whole, three factors explain
most of that growth:  the introduction of new and costlier
drug treatments, broader use of prescription drugs by a
larger number of people, and (until recently) lower cost-
sharing requirements by private health plans. New brand-
name drugs tend to be much more expensive than older
drug therapies that treat the same disease. And even as
prescription drugs have become more costly, more people
have been using them, for several reasons. Many new
drugs provide better treatment or have fewer side effects
than older alternatives. At the same time, insurance cover-
age has made such drugs relatively affordable. In addition,
more people are aware of new drug therapies through
such sources as the Internet and the “direct-to-consumer”
advertising campaigns of pharmaceutical manufacturers.
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Prescription Drug Spending and
Medicare Benefits per Beneficiary,
2003-2012
(By calendar year)
Spending per
Medicare 
Average
Annual
Beneficiary
(Dollars)
Percentage
Change,
2003 2012 2003-2012
Outpatient Prescription Drugsa 2,439 5,816 10.1
Medicare Benefitsb 6,775 10,794 5.3
Memorandum:
Gross Domestic Product
per Capita 37,900 55,800 4.4
Source: Congressional Budget Office’s March 2002 baseline projections.
Note: These numbers assume the continuation of the current Medicare pro-
gram, with no outpatient prescription drug benefit.
a. Total spending per beneficiary on outpatient prescription drugs not currently
covered under Medicare, regardless of payer.
b. Benefits and administrative costs per beneficiary under the Hospital Insur-
ance and Supplementary Medical Insurance programs.
CBO expects prescription drug spending by Medicare
beneficiaries (or their health plans) to rise rapidly over the
next decade—at an average rate per person of 10.1 per-
cent a year (see Table 1).1 That rate is significantly faster
than the projected growth of spending for current Medi-
care benefits, and more than twice as fast as the expected
per capita growth of the U.S. economy. Medicare benefi-
ciaries, employers who offer health coverage for retirees,
and state governments have pushed for a Medicare drug
benefit to obtain some financial relief from those rising
expenditures. 
Distribution of Beneficiaries’
Drug Spending
Although most Medicare beneficiaries use some prescrip-
tion drugs, the bulk of drug spending is concentrated
among a relatively small group. A large share of that
spending pays for the treatment of chronic conditions,
such as hypertension, cardiovascular disease, and diabetes.
The skewed distribution of spending—and the need for
people with chronic conditions to stay on drug therapies
for a long time—makes voluntary stand-alone drug cover-
age particularly susceptible to the problem of adverse
selection, in which enrollment in an insurance plan is
concentrated among people who expect to receive more
in benefits than they pay in premiums. (That problem is
discussed in detail in Chapter 3.)
CBO projects that prescription drug spending by or for
Medicare beneficiaries will total more than $128 billion
in 2005 (the first year in which Medicare could probably
begin implementing a prescription drug benefit that was
enacted in 2002). In that year, about 64 percent of Medi-
care beneficiaries will spend over $1,000 on prescription
drugs, CBO estimates; their combined spending will
make up 96 percent of total drug expenditures by Medi-
care beneficiaries (see Table 2). Only 17 percent of benefi-
ciaries are expected to spend more than $5,000 on pre-
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Prescription Drug Spending by or for
Medicare Beneficiaries, 2005
Spending Level
per Beneficiary
(Dollars)
Percentage of
Beneficiaries with
Spending Above
That Levela
Percentage of
Beneficiaries’
Total Drug
Spendingb
0 89.8 100.0
500 75.1 98.9
1,000 64.4 96.1
2,000 47.4 87.5
3,000 33.7 75.8
4,000 24.5 64.8
5,000 17.3 53.7
6,000 12.4 44.5
7,000 9.3 37.6
8,000 6.9 31.5
9,000 5.5 27.2
10,000 4.3 23.4
Source: Congressional Budget Office’s March 2002 baseline projections.
Note: These numbers do not include spending for outpatient prescription
drugs currently covered by Medicare.
a. Total Medicare enrollment for 2005 is projected to be 41.9 million people.
b. Beneficiaries’ total spending for outpatient prescription drugs in 2005 is
projected to be $128.1 billion.1. That estimate assumes the continuation of the current Medicare
program, with no outpatient prescription drug benefit.
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Sources of Payment for Medicare Beneficiaries’ Prescription Drugs, 1999
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the 1999 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey.
Note: HMOs = health maintenance organizations.
a. These are generally also employment-based plans.
scription drugs in 2005, but their spending will make up
nearly 54 percent of the total.
Beneficiaries’ Existing Drug Coverage
Certain factors suggest that growth in drug spending has
a larger financial impact on Medicare beneficiaries than
on other segments of the population. On average, 40 per-
cent of Medicare beneficiaries’ drug expenditures came
from their own pockets in 1999 (the most recent year for
which data are available), compared with about 33 per-
cent for the U.S. population as a whole (see Figure 2).
Also, because Medicare beneficiaries are elderly or dis-
abled, they are more likely to have chronic health condi-
tions and to use more prescription drugs: nearly 90 per-
cent filled at least one prescription in 1999, compared
with just over 60 percent of the population as a whole.
Medicare beneficiaries made up nearly 15 percent of the
population that year, but they accounted for about
40 percent of spending on outpatient prescription drugs
in the United States.
Overall statistics, however, mask a wide variety of per-
sonal circumstances. In 1999, one-quarter of the Medi-
care population had no prescription drug coverage. The
other three-quarters of beneficiaries obtained drug cover-
age as part of a plan that supplemented Medicare’s bene-
fits. But those supplemental plans differed greatly in the
extent of drug coverage they provided.
Employment-Based Plans
Traditionally, more elderly people have received prescrip-
tion drug coverage from retiree health plans than from
any other source. In 1999, about 30 percent of Medicare
beneficiaries had supplemental health insurance through a
current or former employer, and most of those health
plans covered prescription drugs (see Table 3). Although
specific benefits vary, employment-based drug coverage
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Medicare Beneficiaries’ Prescription Drug Coverage, 1999
Type of Drug Coverage
Number of Medicare
Beneficiaries with
That Coverage
(Millions)
Percentage of
All Medicare
Beneficiaries
Average
Number of
Prescriptions
Filled
Medicaida 6.4 15.9 39
Employment-Based Plan 11.9 29.6 31
Individually Purchased (Medigap) Policy 4.5 11.2 32
Other Public Coverageb 1.7 4.1 37
HMO Not Elsewhere Classifiedc    5.7  14.2 28
Subtotal 30.2 75.0 32
No Drug Coverage  10.1   25.0 25
Total 40.4 100.0 30
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the 1999 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey.
Note: Some Medicare beneficiaries have more than one type of coverage for outpatient prescription drugs. The categories in this table are mutually exclusive, and
CBO assigned people to categories in the order shown above.
a. Beneficiaries who received any Medicaid benefits during the year, including those eligible for a state’s full package of benefits (so-called dual eligibles and people
who meet eligibility requirements after paying their Medicaid expenses).
b. Beneficiaries who received aid for their drug spending through state-sponsored pharmaceutical assistance programs, the Department of Veterans Affairs, the
Department of Defense, or health maintenance organizations under Medicare+Choice nonrisk contracts.
c. Primarily health maintenance organizations under Medicare+Choice risk contracts.
tends to feature relatively low deductibles and copay-
ments.
Many employers have begun to restructure their benefits,
however, because prescription drug spending by elderly
retirees has become a significant cost. A 1997 study by
Hewitt Associates for the Kaiser Family Foundation
found that among large employers, drug spending for
people age 65 or older constituted 40 percent to 60 per-
cent of the total cost of their retiree health plans.2 Average
use of prescription drugs among elderly retirees was more
than double that of current workers. Although relatively
few employers in the Hewitt survey had dropped retiree
coverage altogether, most had taken steps to control costs,
such as tightening eligibility standards, requiring retirees
to pay a greater share of their premiums, placing caps on
the amount of benefits that plans will cover, and encour-
aging elderly beneficiaries to enroll in managed care
plans.
Other Sources of Drug Coverage
Another way in which elderly or disabled people can ob-
tain prescription drug coverage is through Medicare+
Choice (M+C) plans. In 2002, 50 percent of Medicare
beneficiaries have access to M+C plans that offer some
drug coverage. But a far smaller fraction of beneficiaries,
about 9 percent, sign up for those plans. In addition,
many M+C plans have scaled back their drug benefits in
response to higher drug costs and slower growth in Medi-
care’s payment rates. Nearly all such plans have annual
caps on enrollees’ drug benefits, and a growing percentage
charge a premium for supplemental benefits. Some plans
limit their coverage to generic drugs, with no coverage for
brand-name prescriptions.
About 23 percent of the Medicare population relied on
individually purchased (medigap) plans as their main
2. Hewitt Associates, Kaiser Medicare Policy Project, Retiree Health
Trends and Implications of Possible Medicare Reforms (Washington,
D.C.: Hewitt Associates, September 1997), available at www.kff.
org/content/archive/1318/retiree_r.html.
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form of supplemental health coverage in 1999, but less
than half of that group had policies that covered prescrip-
tion drugs. Medigap plans with drug coverage tend to be
much less generous than retiree health plans: they have an
annual deductible of $250, require cost sharing of 50 per-
cent, and limit yearly benefits to either $1,250 or $3,000.
Premiums for medigap plans that include drug coverage
also tend to be much higher than premiums for other
medigap plans, in part because of their tendency to attract
enrollees who have higher-than-average health expenses.
Some low-income Medicare beneficiaries are eligible for
Medicaid coverage, which generally includes a prescrip-
tion drug benefit. All state Medicaid programs offer drug
coverage (usually with little or no cost sharing) to people
whose income and assets fall below certain thresholds. In
addition, as of September 2002, 34 states had authorized
(though not necessarily begun implementing) some type
of pharmaceutical assistance program. Many of those
programs will provide direct aid for drug purchases to
low-income elderly people who do not meet the eligibility
requirements for Medicaid. In all, about 76 percent of the
Medicare population lives in those states.
On average, Medicare beneficiaries with drug coverage
had about 32 prescriptions filled in 1999. Those without
drug coverage used fewer prescription drugs that year, but
they still had an average of 25 prescriptions filled.
Differences by Income Level
Many middle- and higher-income seniors can obtain
coverage through retiree plans, and seniors with the low-
est income generally have access to state-based drug bene-
fit programs. However, Medicare beneficiaries with in-
come between one and three times the federal poverty
level tend to be caught in the middle:  they are less likely
than poorer seniors to qualify for state assistance and less
likely than higher-income seniors to have access to drug
coverage through former employers. In 1999, nearly half
of Medicare beneficiaries had income between one and
three times the poverty level, and almost 30 percent of
them had no drug coverage (see Table 4). People in those
income groups paid more of their drug costs out of
pocket than other Medicare beneficiaries did (44 percent
versus 34 percent).
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Medicare Beneficiaries’ Prescription Drug Coverage and Spending,
by Income Level, 1999
Percentage Spending on Outpatient
Number of Percentage of Income Prescription Drugs
Income Relative Medicare of All Group (Billions of dollars)
to the Federal Beneficiaries Medicare Without Drug Total Out-of-Pocket 
Poverty Level (Millions) Beneficiaries Coverage Spending Spending
Less Than 100 Percent 6.6 16.2 20.0 8.3 2.0
100 to 200 Percent 11.4 28.2 31.4 13.4 5.8
200 to 300 Percent 8.1 20.1 25.5 9.6 4.2
300 Percent or More  14.3   35.4 22.0   19.3   7.4
Total 40.4 100.0 25.0 50.5 19.4
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the 1999 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey.
Note: CBO adjusted each beneficiary’s level of drug spending by 25 percent to reflect underreporting in the survey. Prescription drug spending for survey respon-
dents in nursing homes was imputed from the spending of noninstitutionalized respondents who have trouble with the same number of activities of daily living.

CHAPTER
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Design Choices for a
Medicare Drug Benefit
,n designing a drug benefit for Medicare, policy-
makers must make four fundamental decisions:
 How comprehensive will the coverage be?
 Who will be eligible to enroll?
 To what extent will the government pay enrollees’
costs?
 How and by whom will the drug program be adminis-
tered?
The answers to each of those questions will have a major
impact on the program’s cost to the federal government
and to enrollees. (This chapter and the next describe, in
general, how various approaches to those choices affect
costs. Specific cost estimates for particular proposals are
discussed in Chapter 4.)
In addition, most of those decisions will involve trade-offs
among the various goals for a Medicare prescription drug
benefit. For example, features designed to encourage wide
enrollment—such as extensive coverage, low deductibles
and copayments, broad eligibility, and subsidies for low-
income enrollees—will also make the program more ex-
pensive for the federal government (and possibly for state
and local governments). But features designed to control
costs—such as narrow coverage, high cost sharing by en-
rollees, and limited eligibility—may mean that fewer
Medicare beneficiaries receive the benefits of prescription
drug coverage.
Any program in which the federal government subsidizes
a large share of drug costs for many enrollees will require
substantial federal outlays. Medicare beneficiaries are ex-
pected to spend an average of nearly $2,500 apiece on
outpatient prescription drugs in 2003. Access to better
drug coverage would undoubtedly stimulate further
spending.  However, decisions about how to administer
the drug benefit can exacerbate or alleviate the federal cost
burden. Consequently, those decisions are especially im-
portant.
All of the recent proposals for a Medicare drug program
would rely on private entities to administer the benefit,
but there are significant differences in the functions envi-
sioned for those entities. Opportunities exist to manage
drug use and prices prudently, but pharmacy benefit
managers need both the incentives and the tools to do so.
The Congressional Budget Office has concluded that
among the designs for a Medicare drug program proposed
in the past few years, those with certain administrative
features offer the greatest opportunity for constraining
federal costs and total spending on outpatient prescrip-
tion drugs. Although not without shortcomings, those
designs have three main features: they allow benefit man-
agers to employ the full array of tools now used to admin-
ister private-sector drug plans, they force benefit manag-
ers to compete among themselves for enrollees’ business,
and they make managers assume financial risk for deliver-
ing benefits.
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Hypothetical Structure of a Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
The Structure of the Coverage
The single biggest determinant of the cost of a Medicare
drug benefit is how the coverage is designed. Choices
about the structure of the coverage include:
 The deductible amount (whether coverage begins with
the first dollar of drug spending in a given year or after
the deductible amount is reached);
 Cost-sharing rates (what share of the cost of a prescrip-
tion is the responsibility of the enrollee);1
 The benefit cap (the level of spending beyond which
the enrollee must pay the full cost of each prescrip-
tion); and
 The catastrophic stop-loss amount (the level of spend-
ing beyond which the enrollee pays little or nothing for
prescriptions).
The possible variations on those choices are numerous
and could produce benefits unlike anything available in
the private sector today. Of the four proposals discussed
in Chapter 4, the Clinton Administration’s plan and
H.R. 4680 both include a capped benefit, then a “hole” (a
level of spending at which there would be no drug cover-
age), and finally a stop-loss provision, beyond which the
benefit would pay all drug costs (see Figure 3). Plans cur-
rently available through employers, by contrast, almost
never include such holes in coverage. The larger the range
of spending encompassed by the hole, the less costly the
program would be—but also the less coverage the benefit
would provide.   
The structure of the coverage also indirectly affects the
cost of the drug program through the out-of-pocket
1. Cost-sharing rates can be specified as dollar amounts (copayments)
or as a percentage of costs (coinsurance).
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spending it requires of enrollees. Benefits with low cost-
sharing rates would encourage enrollees who were newly
shielded from paying the full costs of their drugs to use a
greater number of—and more expensive—prescriptions.
Conversely, higher cost-sharing rates would induce less
new drug spending.
Eligibility for Enrollment
A fundamental design choice concerns whether the pre-
scription drug benefit would be available to all Medicare
beneficiaries or only some (on the basis of such criteria as
income, wealth, or current drug coverage). The cost of
the drug program could be reduced by limiting eligibility.
However, most recent proposals for Medicare drug cover-
age would allow all Medicare beneficiaries to enroll, al-
though they would provide much higher subsidies to low-
income beneficiaries.
A second choice for policymakers is whether to make en-
rollment in the benefit voluntary and, if so, with what
restrictions. A voluntary drug program that did not limit
when and how often an eligible person could enroll
would encourage beneficiaries to sign up only when they
expected to incur high drug costs and to opt out again
when they expected little need for prescription drugs. All
of the proposals examined in Chapter 4 would provide a
voluntary drug benefit, but they would restrict that choice
by giving people only one opportunity to enroll without
penalty (when they first became eligible), or by imposing
a surcharge on people who delayed enrollment, to reflect
the higher costs that such enrollees typically entail.
(When the drug program began, however, all Medicare
beneficiaries, regardless of age, would have a chance to
sign up for the coverage.)
Besides those two restrictions, another way to reduce
beneficiaries’ incentives to enroll or drop coverage at will
would be to couple the drug benefit with Part B of
Medicare (Supplementary Medical Insurance). In that
case, beneficiaries could choose either Part B plus drug
coverage or no Part B and no drug coverage. Because
Medicare currently pays 75 percent of Part B benefits,
and because enrollment in Part B without penalty is re-
stricted to a brief period after eligibility begins, virtually
all Medicare beneficiaries sign up for Part B. Linking the
drug benefit to enrollment in Part B would probably
ensure reasonably high participation in the benefit. How-
ever, if enrollment in Part B required enrollment in the
drug program and the full premium (for Part B plus
drugs) rose substantially as a result, some people who
would otherwise enroll in Part B might drop that cover-
age.
The Level and Structure
of Federal Subsidies
Two important design choices are how much the federal
government would contribute to the cost of drug cover-
age for Medicare beneficiaries and how such subsidies
would be structured. Those design choices have conse-
quences not only for federal costs but also for costs to
state and local governments. In addition, the level of sub-
sidy offered to enrollees would have an important effect
on people’s willingness to take part in the drug program.
Most of the Medicare drug benefits proposed recently in
the Congress would provide some level of federal subsidy
for all enrollees, but they would still require those en-
rollees to contribute substantially—through both cost
sharing and premiums. To make drug coverage more
affordable to low-income Medicare beneficiaries, most
proposals would provide a higher federal subsidy for en-
rollees who met certain eligibility criteria.
Subsidies for All Enrollees
The higher the subsidy, the greater the number of people
who would want to enroll in a drug benefit, but also the
greater the costs to the federal government. Widespread
enrollment is desirable for two reasons: it means that the
drug benefit is accomplishing the goal of providing insur-
ance to most Medicare beneficiaries, and it reduces the
likelihood that enrollees will be drawn disproportionately
from people who expect to have high drug costs. The
question for policymakers is, How large would the federal
subsidy have to be to induce most Medicare beneficiaries
to enroll?
Even if the federal subsidy was small, enrollment would
still be fairly high because many people with private or
public drug coverage would probably be required to en-
roll. For example, employment-based health plans would
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probably require retirees eligible for a Medicare drug
benefit to participate in it, just as they now effectively
require that retirees participate in Part B. Even employers
who offered to pay Medicare’s drug premium for retirees
would have lower costs so long as that premium was sub-
sidized to any extent (assuming their retirees were not
markedly less costly than the average Medicare partici-
pant). The more comprehensive Medicare’s drug coverage
was, the more employers’ health care costs for retirees
would be reduced, but they would probably take advan-
tage of even a limited drug benefit. Likewise, state Medic-
aid agencies, even if not required to do so, would choose
to enroll people eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid
in a Medicare drug program if states’ costs under the new
program were less than under Medicaid’s current drug
benefit.
Thus, the people whose participation would be most
sensitive to the size of the federal subsidy would be the
one-quarter of Medicare beneficiaries without drug cover-
age from private or public sources. If the drug benefit was
not subsidized and enrollment was always open, few of
those beneficiaries would be likely to enroll. If, however,
they had only one chance to enroll without financial pen-
alty, some of those beneficiaries would probably take part
without any  federal subsidy, and most would choose to
enroll at subsidy rates well below 100 percent of the cost.
The reason is that virtually all beneficiaries would expect
to receive more in benefits in some years than the premi-
ums they paid. One-time-only enrollment would also
increase the extent of participation for any given level of
subsidy.  However, a drug benefit that was financed
mainly by enrollees could be difficult for some people to
afford—specifically, people whose income or assets were
only slightly too high to qualify for drug coverage
through Medicaid or other public programs.
Subsidies for Low-Income Enrollees
Creating an additional subsidy program for low-income
users of a Medicare drug benefit requires making deci-
sions about such things as eligibility for the subsidy, the
size of the subsidy, and whether states would pay a share.
Those choices would affect enrollment in the drug benefit
and its cost to the federal government and the states.
Who Would Be Eligible? As noted earlier, some low-
income Medicare beneficiaries receive assistance for part
or all of their medical costs through the federal/state
Medicaid program. Those beneficiaries fall into three
categories.
 Dual eligibles meet all state requirements for Medicaid
eligibility, either because their income and assets are
below the limits set by a state or because they have
“spent down” their resources to those limits as a result
of high medical costs (in which case they are referred to
as the medically needy). People in the first group have
their Medicare premiums and cost sharing paid by
Medicaid. They also receive all Medicaid benefits, in-
cluding coverage for prescription drugs. Most medi-
cally needy beneficiaries receive the same benefits, al-
though a few states do not cover their expenses for
drugs.
 Qualified Medicare beneficiaries (QMBs) have income
below the federal poverty level and meet certain restric-
tions on financial assets. About 75 percent of them
qualify as dual eligibles; the other 25 percent are eligi-
ble for benefits only as QMBs. That group has its
Medicare premiums and cost sharing paid by Medicaid
but is not eligible for other Medicaid benefits, such as
drug coverage.
 Specified low-income Medicare beneficiaries (SLMBs)
have income between 100 percent and 120 percent of
the federal poverty level and meet certain restrictions
on financial assets. About one-third of them qualify as
dual eligibles; the other two-thirds qualify only as
SLMBs. The sole benefit that SLMBs receive from
Medicaid is payment of their Medicare Part B premi-
ums.
Most proposals for a Medicare drug benefit include some
form of low-income subsidy for beneficiaries in all of
those categories.
In addition, most recent Medicare drug proposals would
assist other low-income Medicare beneficiaries. Proposals
typically call for providing subsidies to all enrollees with
CHAPTER TWO DESIGN CHOICES FOR A MEDICARE DRUG BENEFIT 13
income below 135 percent of the poverty level (and lim-
ited assets), which would cover their premiums and cost
sharing for prescription drugs. Enrollees with income
between 135 percent and 150 percent of the poverty level
would have some or all of their premiums subsidized.
Many proposals would extend the subsidies to enrollees
with even higher income. (A few proposals would remove
limits on assets.)
How Much Would States Pay? A key design choice for
low-income subsidies is how much would be funded by
the federal government and how much by the states. The
federal government now pays 57 percent of Medicaid
costs, on average, with the states covering the rest. Some
proposals for a Medicare drug benefit would maintain the
current federal percentage for dual eligibles and QMBs.
However, the federal government would pay the full
subsidy for other low-income enrollees (those who met
special income and asset limits established for low-income
subsidies in the drug program). Other proposals would
require the federal government to pay the full cost of the
subsidies for all low-income enrollees, including dual
eligibles. In many of those cases, states would be required
to reimburse the federal government for some share of the
amount they saved under the proposal.
A proposal that increased the federal government’s share
of the cost of low-income subsidies would reduce states’
costs, and vice versa. The low-income subsidy would also
augment or (at the state’s option) replace state-run drug
programs for low-income seniors who are not eligible for
Medicaid. As noted earlier, 34 states either have intro-
duced or are planning to introduce such programs. A
federal subsidy of Medicare beneficiaries in those pro-
grams would directly reduce state spending.
Who Would Participate? The cost of a low-income sub-
sidy program would ultimately depend on how many
people participated. Not all eligible Medicare beneficia-
ries would choose to receive a low-income subsidy even if
they enrolled in the drug benefit. Some might want to
avoid being associated with a government “welfare” pro-
gram; others might not believe that they were eligible for
or needed the subsidy.
What entity was chosen to administer the low-income
subsidy program could affect the level of participation.
CBO estimates that only 50 percent of people eligible for
QMB subsidies and 30 percent of those eligible for
SLMB subsidies take part in those programs today. Most
recent proposals for a Medicare drug benefit would rely
on state Medicaid agencies to determine eligibility and
enroll low-income beneficiaries—as the QMB and SLMB
programs do now. However, another option would be to
have the Social Security Administration (SSA) provide
those enrollment services. Participation would be higher
under that arrangement because less “welfare” stigma is
associated with SSA than with Medicaid.
As was the case with subsidies for all enrollees, the size of
the low-income subsidies would also influence participa-
tion. A larger subsidy would almost certainly induce more
people to take part in the low-income program.
That effect would also depend on the design of the
Medicare drug coverage. High deductibles or premiums
might persuade eligible low-income beneficiaries to sign
up for the low-income subsidy to cover those up-front
costs. Similarly, the more generous the coverage of drug
expenses beyond the deductible, the stronger would be
the incentive to enroll.
Perhaps the major issue affecting participation by low-
income beneficiaries is whether the asset standards now in
place for Medicaid would be relaxed for the Medicare
drug benefit. Most proposals would retain the asset stan-
dards currently used to determine QMBs and SLMBs.
However, less-stringent standards would expand the
number of people eligible for low-income subsidies.
The Effect on Spending for Medicaid. Adding prescrip-
tion drug coverage to Medicare would alter not only fed-
eral spending for that program but also federal and state
spending for Medicaid. Such coverage would reduce
Medicaid’s costs for dual eligibles because Medicare
would pick up part of their prescription drug costs. How-
ever, some of that reduction would be offset by higher
enrollment in the Medicaid program. Some people who
are now eligible for Medicaid do not enroll; a Medicare
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drug benefit would give them a new incentive to do so,
because under most proposals, state Medicaid programs
would administer the low-income subsidies. Thus, people
applying for Medicare drug coverage under the low-in-
come subsidy would learn about their eligibility for
Medicaid and enroll in that program at the same time.
Other Factors Affecting the Cost of Low-Income Subsi-
dies. The effect on federal costs for low-income subsidies
would depend not just on the factors discussed above but
also on the interplay between the coverage provided by a
Medicare drug benefit and the provisions for low-income
subsidies. In general, increasing cost sharing for enrollees
in the drug benefit would lead to higher federal subsidies
for low-income enrollees. Conversely, reducing enrollees’
cost sharing would result in lower federal costs for low-
income subsidies.
Administrative Approach
The way in which a Medicare drug program was adminis-
tered could also have a significant impact on its cost.
Most recent proposals envision the approach—now com-
mon in the private sector—of using organizations such as
pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) to administer the
benefit. The proposals differ, however, in the number of
such organizations that would serve a region, the restric-
tions they would be subject to, the basis on which they
could compete for enrollees, and whether they would as-
sume any insurance risk. (Insurance risk occurs when the
entity providing coverage is liable for payments that may
not be fully covered by premiums or reimbursements or,
conversely, is allowed to keep part of surpluses when costs
fall short of premiums or reimbursements.)
In the past decade, PBMs have come to play a central role
in administering  prescription drug benefits in the private
sector (see Figure 4). Their main function is to act as a
health plan’s agent in administering a drug benefit. PBMs
do not distribute prescription drugs to patients, except
when they own mail-order or community pharmacies.
Instead, prescription drugs flow from manufacturers to
dispensing pharmacies (often with stops along the way at
wholesalers’ warehouses) and then to consumers, either at
pharmacies or by mail. A pharmacy pays a manufacturer
for the drugs it purchases and in turn charges a price it
has negotiated with the PBM. The consumer and health
plan share the responsibility for paying that price.
PBMs perform various functions and use various manage-
ment tools. They process and pay claims. On behalf of a
health plan and its enrollees, they also negotiate price
discounts with dispensing pharmacies and rebates with
drug manufacturers. In return for receiving rebates,
PBMs try to steer enrollees toward preferred or formulary
drugs. (A formulary is a list of drugs that the health plan
will cover. Nonpreferred drugs are covered and therefore
included in the formulary, but they typically entail higher
cost sharing for the enrollee than preferred drugs do.)
PBMs’ other strategies for lowering costs include encour-
aging the use of generic drugs and dispensing drugs
through mail-order pharmacies, which many large PBMs
own. PBMs may establish and enforce differential cost-
sharing requirements to encourage enrollees to select
lower-cost drugs. In addition, because they keep central-
ized records of each enrollee’s prescriptions, they can help
prevent inappropriate dosages and harmful drug inter-
actions.2
Although PBMs in the private sector often have consider-
able leeway in the tools they can use, they do not assume
any insurance risk for the drug benefits they administer.
However, they may have a bonus added to, or a penalty
subtracted from, their administrative fee on the basis of
how well they meet preset goals for their performance.
Some of the Medicare drug proposals developed during
the 106th Congress, such as the Clinton Administra-
tion’s, called for a single PBM selected periodically to
serve each region, with all insurance risk borne by Medi-
care, not the PBM. Other proposals, such as H.R. 4680,
adopted a different approach: they would use multiple
risk-bearing entities (such as PBM/insurer partnerships)
that would compete to serve enrollees in each region.  En-
2. See, for example, E.P. Armstrong and C.R. Denemark, “How
Pharmacists Respond to On-Line, Real-Time DUR Alerts,” Jour-
nal of the American Pharmaceutical Association, vol. 38, no. 2
(March-April 1998), pp. 149-154; and Stephen Soumerai and
Helene Lipton, “Computer-Based Drug-Utilization Review,” New
England Journal of Medicine, vol. 332, no. 24 (June 15, 1995), pp.
1641-1645. 
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The Role of PBMs in the Flow of Money and Prescription Drugs
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Note: PBM = pharmacy benefit manager.
rollees would have some choice among entities, so people
who were willing to accept more restrictive rules (such as
a limited formulary) in return for lower cost sharing or
premiums could do so, while others could select a more
expensive plan with fewer restrictions. Hybrid models
have been proposed in which multiple entities would
compete for enrollees without bearing insurance risk.
They could compete on the basis of such features as lower
drug prices, fewer limits on covered drugs, and wider net-
works of pharmacies.
Each administrative model has its pros and cons. The
next chapter describes how each model addresses key
problems inherent in designing a Medicare prescription
drug program—such as the risk to plans from enrolling a
disproportionately large share of people with high ex-
pected drug costs, the need to control drug spending, and
the feasibility of administering the benefit efficiently.

CHAPTER

Problems in Designing
a Medicare Drug Benefit
$ lthough the choices available to policymakers
seem numerous, many proposals for a Medicare prescrip-
tion drug benefit have certain similarities. The reason is
that they are trying to address specific problems that arise
in designing such a benefit. Those problems include the
possibility that the coverage will mainly attract people
with the highest drug costs, the need to constrain total
costs to the government and to enrollees, the ability and
willingness of private entities (such as pharmacy benefit
managers) to administer the drug benefit, and the possible
side effects of the drug program on other parts of Medi-
care.
Selection Issues
Policies that would provide stand-alone prescription drug
benefits may be especially prone to the insurance-market
phenomenon known as adverse selection, in which people
who expect to have higher-than-average costs dispropor-
tionately enroll in an insurance plan. Adverse selection
becomes an issue when plans (or potential enrollees) make
decisions based on the desire to avoid attracting (or being
grouped with) enrollees who are likely to have expensive
claims. For example, the threat of adverse selection may
lead insurers to design or manage their plans in such a
way as to discourage people with high expected claims
from joining. Or they may market their plans in ways that
will avoid such enrollees. Similarly, potential enrollees
would prefer not to be put in an insurance pool with
people who were likely to have high costs, because that
would imply higher premiums than would otherwise be
the case. Thus, the potential for adverse selection might
cause some people to opt out of insurance altogether.
Adverse selection can occur in an insurance market if
subgroups of potential enrollees can be expected to use
benefits at a rate that will differ substantially from that of
other groups. In the case of prescription drugs, demand is
strongly related to whether a person has a chronic medical
condition. Thus, many Medicare beneficiaries may have a
good idea of their likely drug spending in the short run
and, in some cases, even in the long run. If the plan (or
plans) that offered Medicare drug coverage could not dis-
tinguish between enrollees with high or low expected
costs—or was not permitted to treat such enrollees differ-
ently in terms of benefits offered or premiums charged
—then adverse selection could occur in a voluntary drug
program. 
Why Is Adverse Selection a Problem?
Adverse selection poses difficulties in several ways. It
undermines the purpose of health insurance, which is to
spread among a pool of people the financial risks that
would arise if some of them developed medical problems.
Adverse selection raises the cost of insurance for people
who do enroll. And it makes people who do not enroll
worse off by not receiving the benefits of insurance. (Even
people who anticipate having low medical costs could
benefit from insuring against the possibility that they
develop an unexpected illness.)
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In private insurance markets, adverse selection can create
a pattern of high premiums and low enrollment, resulting
in much less coverage than would otherwise have been the
case.1 The history of private medigap policies that cover
outpatient prescription drugs is a case in point. A variety
of insurers sell medigap policies to Medicare beneficiaries
who typically lack other sources of supplementary cover-
age. Since 1992, insurers have been allowed to market
only 10 standardized medigap policies, and an insurer
must charge the same premium for a given policy to all
beneficiaries who enroll when they first become eligible
for Medicare. Premiums can rise with a policyholder’s age
but cannot vary according to his or her health status.
Three of the 10 medigap policies available to Medicare
beneficiaries include some coverage of prescription drugs.
However, that coverage is limited by benefit caps. Even
so, those plans are costly compared with medigap plans
that exclude drugs.2 Most experts agree that the reason for
the higher costs is that people who buy the drug policies
are more likely to use prescription drugs than people who
do not.3 Today, only 8 percent of Medicare beneficiaries
with standardized medigap policies are enrolled in any of
the three plans that provide drug coverage.4
Two kinds of adverse selection can affect the operation of
a Medicare drug benefit:  adverse selection into the drug
program as a whole, and, if multiple plans are allowed to
administer the drug benefit in the same region and bear
financial risk for their costs, adverse selection among
those plans. 
Adverse Selection Into the Overall Drug Program
If relatively healthy Medicare beneficiaries (such as those
with no chronic conditions) tended to opt out of drug
coverage, the result would be higher per capita costs and
premiums for enrollees than would be the case if the ben-
efit covered a representative mix of Medicare beneficia-
ries. Moreover, if people could enroll or unenroll in the
drug program at any time, some would go from paying
no premium when healthy (and paying drug expenses out
of pocket if an acute condition developed) to enrolling
and paying a high premium when they developed a con-
dition requiring treatment with prescription drugs.5 Such
1. In an extreme situation, adverse selection can lead to the absence
of an insurance market for some types of risks. For example, in the
individual insurance market, health plans will not cover people
who have been diagnosed with certain conditions (or will not cover
services for those conditions) even though they could charge such
people a higher premium; see Joseph P. Newhouse, “Reimbursing
Health Plans and Health Providers: Efficiency in Production Ver-
sus Selection,” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 34 (September
1996), pp. 1236-1263. Researchers have constructed models of
the insurance market in which, given the choice between a man-
aged care plan and a fee-for-service plan, more people join the
managed care plan than would do so in the absence of selection
issues. That happens because the relative premiums of the two
types of plans are affected by the health risks of the people who
join the plans. If healthier people, on average, prefer a managed
care plan, that plan’s premiums will be lower than they would
have been solely on the basis of any efficiency advantage of the
managed care plan. See Roger Feldman and Bryan Dowd, “Risk
Segmentation: Goal or Problem?” Journal of Health Economics, vol.
19 (2000), pp. 499-512.
2. Lauren A. McCormack and others, “Medigap Reform Legislation
of 1990: Have the Objectives Been Met?” Health Care Financing
Review, vol. 18, no. 1 (Fall 1996), pp. 157-174.
3. People with drug coverage may have higher drug spending than
other people for two reasons: adverse selection and the utilization
effect of insurance (known as moral hazard in the economics litera-
ture). The utilization effect refers to people’s greater willingness to
spend money on something, such as prescription drugs, when the
price they pay has been lowered because of their insurance. The
literature on medigap coverage has emphasized adverse selection as
the more important reason for high drug spending in medigap
policies that cover prescription drugs.
4. See General Accounting Office, Medigap Insurance: Plans Are
Widely Available but Have Limited Benefits and May Have High
Costs, GAO-01-941 (July 2001). That estimate does not include
the 40 percent of existing medigap policies that either were issued
before benefits were standardized in 1992 or are otherwise exempt
from the federal standards. Some of those older policies include
prescription drug coverage.
5. Even with some adverse selection, however, the drug benefit could
still offer a significant degree of insurance as long as the frequency
with which a person could enroll or unenroll was limited in some
way. Future medical costs can rarely be predicted accurately, so a
drug benefit would help insure against uncertainty even for en-
rollees with chronic illnesses.
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behavior would undermine the value of health insurance,
which depends on collecting premiums from people while
they are healthy so that enough funds are available to pay
the bills of people who face medical expenses.
Paradoxically, although adverse selection into the drug
program would increase costs per enrollee, it would most
likely reduce the total cost of the drug benefit, because the
number of participants would be so much smaller. Such a
situation could become unstable, however, with premi-
ums continuing to grow and enrollment continuing to
drop.
A number of strategies exist to offset the effects of adverse
selection into the drug program by encouraging many
people to participate. First, and perhaps most effective,
would be requiring one-time enrollment. A “choose it or
lose it” policy would foster high participation because
even healthy Medicare beneficiaries might be concerned
enough about developing an expensive medical condition
later on that they would take advantage of a one-time
opportunity to enroll. Participation might be further
increased by making enrollment in the program auto-
matic unless the beneficiary took action to reject drug
coverage.
A second way to limit adverse selection would be to pro-
vide substantial government subsidies for the drug bene-
fit. Because people are generally averse to risk, they are
willing to buy insurance even if the premiums they pay
exceed the value of the claims they expect to file over the
length of the policy. (People who are more risk averse
than the norm will be willing to pay even more in premi-
ums for a policy with a given expected payout.)  A gov-
ernment subsidy would increase the likelihood that a
person would receive insurance benefits in excess of his or
her premiums, so that person would be more likely to
sign up for a policy. Thus, if the government paid, say, 30
percent of an enrollee’s premium for drug coverage, even
relatively healthy Medicare beneficiaries might find it
advantageous to join a pool of less-healthy enrollees if
their premium reflected only 70 percent of such costs.
And, of course, the greater the number of healthy en-
rollees who joined, the lower that premium would be-
come.
A third way to address adverse selection is by adjusting
premiums for individuals’ differences in expected risk (a
practice known as risk rating, which is used in many types
of insurance).6 If healthy enrollees were charged a lower
premium that reflected their expected cost to the drug
program, they would be more likely to join. However,
adjusting the premiums that enrollees pay according to
their risk of high spending has not been part of Medicare
policy or of any recent proposal for a Medicare drug ben-
efit.7
Some observers would argue that it would be unfair to
charge higher premiums to enrollees whose drug costs
were expected to be high because of preexisting medical
conditions.8 Also, some people might argue that Medicare
is a form of social insurance that is intended to insure
against changes in health status that occur before people
reach the eligibility age for Medicare. In that view, every-
one joining Medicare when they first become eligible
should face the same premium, regardless of their health
6. In this study, “risk rating” generally refers to charging people dif-
ferent premiums on the basis of differences in their expected costs.
Such differential premiums could be determined when people first
enrolled in a plan, on the basis of their health status and history, or
could result from periodic adjustments to their premiums based on
their claims experience (a practice known as “experience rating”).
Those two approaches are not mutually exclusive.
7. Medicare does charge higher premiums to people who decline
enrollment in Part B and later decide to join. That policy is in-
tended to strongly discourage people from enrolling only when
they are about to face a large medical bill. By contrast, the risk-
rated premiums described above are not surcharges for late enroll-
ment but rather differential premiums that would be charged to
enrollees when they were first eligible to join, with limited adjust-
ments over time.  
8. Other observers have pointed out the inherent subjectivity in fair-
ness arguments. Mark Pauly asks whether it is reasonable for a
relatively healthy lower-middle-income person to subsidize a sickly
rich person, which is an implication of charging all enrollees the
same premium. Pauly suggests that other ways may exist to subsi-
dize sickly people besides requiring uniform premiums. See Mark
V. Pauly, “Is Cream-Skimming a Problem for the Competitive
Medical Market?” Journal of Health Economics, vol. 3, no. 1
(March 1984), pp. 87-95.
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status.9 Also, if Medicare policy allowed people’s premi-
ums to vary over time as their health condition or claims
costs changed, enrollees would be denied the benefit of
being insured against such changes—a benefit that exists
when a plan must charge the same premium to everyone.
However, enrollees would still be insured against unex-
pected needs for prescription drugs that arose during the
period over which the premium was fixed.
A fourth way to reduce adverse selection would be to
make the drug program a mandatory part of Medicare
Part B. If drug coverage was incorporated into the
broader range of Medicare health benefits, even people
who expected to have low drug costs would be inclined to
enroll in order to insure against the general medical costs
they might face.
Adverse Selection Among Drug Plans
Proposals for a prescription drug benefit that call for
competing plans, each facing insurance risk for the claims
they pay, can result in interplan adverse selection.10 That
type of adverse selection occurs when beneficiaries with
high expected drug costs enroll in certain plans (and
avoid others) because they find the design of the coverage
or the services offered by certain plans to be particularly
appealing (or because the behavior of some insurers dis-
courages them from enrolling in other plans). Interplan
adverse selection is likely to exist in two main instances:
when plans cannot easily identify potential enrollees with
low expected drug costs versus those with high expected
costs; and when, even if they can make that identification,
plans are not allowed (or find it costly) to charge different
premiums to enrollees on the basis of different expected
costs.
Recent proposals that envision multiple at-risk plans
competing for enrollees in the same market would require
each plan to charge all of its enrollees in that market the
same premium, thus making the problems associated with
interplan adverse selection more likely. Requiring a plan
to charge a uniform premium (often called community
rating) may be justified on the grounds that the purpose
of health plans is to insure people against medical prob-
lems over long periods of time (perhaps even against
problems that occurred before they were covered by a
plan). The alternative practice, allowing adjustments to
premiums through risk rating, may be impractical and
would reduce the value of insurance protection.11
The potential for interplan adverse selection would be
even greater if the government set a single premium for
all of the at-risk plans in a region instead of allowing each
plan to set its own premium (even if it had to charge that
premium to all of its enrollees). In the latter case, a plan
that appealed disproportionately to enrollees with higher
expected costs could charge a bigger premium to make up
for those costs. For their part, higher-cost enrollees might
be willing to pay that premium if they found the services
or coverage of the plan sufficiently more attractive than
those of alternative plans. If, instead, the government set a
single premium for all plans, that safety valve for plans
would not be available. As a result, plans would be more
likely to engage in behavior aimed at avoiding adverse
selection (by encouraging favorable selection), unless the
government took steps to prevent it.12
How Competing Plans Respond to the Risk of Adverse
Selection. When adverse selection appears likely, insurers
have various ways to avoid enrolling people who are apt
9. In some cases, one person may have a history of higher medical
costs than another person not because of poorer health but because
of a greater inclination to seek medical care. It may be reasonable
to charge a higher premium to someone who has shown a greater
willingness to use medical treatment for a given health status.  In
practical terms, however, it would be difficult to separate medical
spending that reflected differences in health status from spending
that reflected a greater tendency to seek treatment.
10. More generally, the difficulties associated with interplan adverse
selection can arise if those plans have a financial stake in keeping
per capita claims costs down. That could happen under proposals
in which plans did not assume a pure insurance role. For example,
if a plan’s administrative fee would be reduced or forfeited when
the plan exceeded some performance standard that was highly cor-
related with per capita claims costs, the issue of interplan adverse
selection would be a problem.
11. Administrative costs would probably limit risk rating even if plans
were legally permitted to charge differential premiums. In that
case, plans might develop a limited number of rates tied to previ-
ous claims or specific health conditions.
12. Favorable selection is disproportionate enrollment by people with
low expected costs.
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to prove unprofitable. One obvious strategy is for plans to
aim their marketing at subgroups of the elderly whom
they expect to be relatively healthy. Marketing a plan ag-
gressively at golf clubs but not at nursing homes, for ex-
ample, might reach low-cost enrollees while avoiding
high-cost ones.
Medicare drug plans would probably also design their
benefit packages in ways that would appeal to relatively
healthy enrollees rather than people with high expected
costs. They might cap benefits at levels below those likely
to be reached by seniors who have chronic conditions that
are associated with high drug costs, or they might require
substantial cost sharing. They could also use restrictive
formularies to tailor their plan’s appeal to people who
expect to have low drug costs.
In the competition for enrollees with low expected costs,
plans might end up offering similar insurance policies
and, to discourage high-cost enrollees, might offer the
minimum benefit permitted. But even having similar
policies would not completely erase the risk of adverse
selection or discourage plans from trying to achieve favor-
able selection, because plans could adopt many different
approaches to vary the quantity, quality, and price of the
services they offered. Thus, each plan would remain un-
certain about the impact of its own and its rivals’ ap-
proaches on the pool of enrollees it would attract.
Because plans might try to avoid unprofitable enrollees by
offering sparse benefits, premiums could well be lower
than they would be without the risk of interplan adverse
selection. Nevertheless, those premiums would probably
still be higher relative to the benefits offered than would
otherwise be the case. The reason is that plans might
respond to the uncertainty of adverse selection by charg-
ing higher premiums, which they could use to accumulate
reserve assets to cover unexpectedly high claims. In gen-
eral, plans’ fears of adverse selection are likely to be great-
est in the early years of a Medicare drug benefit, as plans
learn how enrollees respond to their options and what
packages their competitors are offering. 
Another result of adverse selection among plans could be
an unstable insurance market, in which plans that initially
achieved favorable selection would have lower costs and
premiums than plans that experienced adverse selection,
causing enrollees to migrate from higher-cost to lower-
cost plans.
Ways to Prevent Interplan Adverse Selection. The gov-
ernment could employ various policy tools to mitigate the
negative effects of interplan adverse selection: standard-
izing plans’ benefits, standardizing their marketing, or
compensating plans for their differential costs through re-
insurance or risk adjustment. In addition, as noted above,
the government could allow drug plans to charge risk-
rated premiums. However, mechanisms that would re-
duce adverse selection might create other problems.
Standardized Benefits. One strategy would be to require
all competing plans to offer certain features. Standardiz-
ing deductibles, cost sharing, benefit caps, and other as-
pects of coverage, for example, would keep plans from
using those features as agents of selection. But standardiz-
ing benefits might not prevent all selection-related behav-
ior. Plans could use restrictive formularies and other man-
agement tools to deter enrollees with high expected costs
from choosing them. Virtually all recent legislative pro-
posals have tried to prevent such behavior by requiring
plans that use formularies to offer at least one drug in
every therapeutic class. (Some proposals have required
that plans offer two or more drugs in each class.)
Standardizing benefits could introduce other drawbacks:
for instance, the benefit design that was written into regu-
lations might not encourage cost-effective use of the vari-
ous drugs that are available. Likewise, standardization
could stifle innovations in benefit design that might bring
about more cost-effective use of prescription drugs. Also,
consumers would lose the opportunity to find a plan tai-
lored to their preferences for financial risk or their will-
ingness to face a limited choice of drugs or pharmacies in
exchange for lower premiums.
Standardized Marketing. Another possible means to re-
duce adverse selection is to standardize the ways in which
competing entities market their drug plans. Requiring all
plans to use similar marketing materials and to have the
same procedure for enrolling beneficiaries could prevent
plans from targeting their marketing efforts toward con-
sumers who are expected to have lower costs. However,
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standardized marketing materials could also make differ-
ences in coverage more apparent, which (in the absence of
standardized benefits) might give plans more incentive to
avoid designs that were likely to appeal to enrollees with
high expected costs.
Reinsurance. Another way to counter adverse selection is
for the government to provide reinsurance to participat-
ing plans. (Reinsurance involves a second insurer—in this
case, the federal government—assuming some or all of
the first insurer’s risk.) Under one type of reinsurance
mechanism, a drug plan would receive government funds
on the basis of the level of claims incurred by each of its
enrollees. If an enrollee’s claims in a year reached a spe-
cific level, the government would pay the plan a certain
fraction of the enrollee’s additional claims costs. That
fraction would increase as the enrollee’s claims grew. A
schedule of rising marginal reinsurance payments to plans
would reduce incentives for selection because plans would
receive higher subsidy rates for enrollees who incurred
greater drug costs.
Reinsurance payments could also be based on a plan’s
average claims cost for all enrollees. Only those plans
whose average cost exceeded some threshold amount
would receive reinsurance payments to cover part or all of
that cost. Neither kind of reinsurance would eliminate the
possibility of adverse selection, but they would cushion its
financial effects on plans and therefore reduce its costs.
Because reinsurance would be retrospective (based on in-
curred claims), however, it would have an important dis-
advantage: it would weaken incentives for drug plans to
control spending. A plan that controlled costs more effec-
tively would receive a lower proportional federal subsidy
because its enrollees would be less likely to reach the
spending thresholds that trigger reinsurance subsidies. As
a result, reinsurance might reward inefficiency by cover-
ing a portion of plans’ high costs no matter what the
cause.
Risk-Adjustment Mechanisms. The government could also
avoid interplan adverse selection by using risk-adjustment
mechanisms. Under such a mechanism, the government
would pay additional money to plans that enrolled a dis-
proportionate number of people with medical conditions
or other characteristics (such as age) associated with
higher drug costs. Ideally, such a mechanism would offer
additional payments that were large enough to neutralize
plans’ incentives to avoid enrollees who were expected to
have high drug costs.
Unlike reinsurance, a risk-adjustment mechanism would
be prospective rather than retrospective. In other words, it
would base the government’s payments to plans on likely
claims rather than actual claims. Ideally, those payments
would be determined in part by measures of an enrollee’s
health status that were considered good predictors of
future drug costs. However, developing an effective risk-
adjustment mechanism is still a work in progress. (For
more details, see Box 1.)
Risk Rating. A system that allowed plans to charge differ-
ent premiums according to each enrollee’s experience
with, or likelihood of, claims could also reduce plans’
incentives to avoid high-cost enrollees. However, as noted
above, such risk-rated premiums dilute the degree to
which an insurance plan protects enrollees from uncer-
tainty about their financial liability over the long run.
Policymakers might want to devise a subsidy scheme to
cushion the effects of higher premiums on enrollees who
were categorized as having high expected costs. A risk-
adjusted premium subsidy by the government would be a
way of implementing experience rating without demand-
ing higher premiums from enrollees.
If potential enrollees can judge their expected claims
better than health plans can, even risk rating of premiums
may not be enough to eliminate adverse-selection behav-
ior. The reason is that plans might not be able to deter-
mine the premium differentials they would need to
charge to protect themselves against attracting enrollees
who turned out to be more costly than expected.
Cost Containment
With Medicare beneficiaries expected to use nearly $87
billion of outpatient prescription drugs this year—and
that amount projected to grow by about 12 percent per
year—adding subsidized drug coverage to Medicare
would represent a major financial commitment for the
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The Feasibility of Risk Adjusting the Drug Benefit in Competitive Plans
Risk adjustment is a method for varying payments to a
health plan according to the expected variation in health care
costs among the plan’s beneficiaries.  (In the case of a Medi-
care drug benefit, those payments would come from the
federal government.) Payment rates are set on the basis of a
beneficiary’s risk status before each enrollment period begins.
Risk adjustment reduces the incentive that plans have to
avoid enrolling people who are likely to incur high health
care costs.
Risk adjustment is used in some private-sector health insur-
ance plans and in Medicare’s payments to Medicare+Choice
plans.1 However, a proven risk-adjustment mechanism does
not yet exist for prescription drugs, although researchers are
working to create one. For such a mechanism to be success-
ful, it would have to be able to predict an enrollee’s future
drug costs with a high degree of accuracy. Moreover, it
would need to use predictors whose values could not be
changed by the actions of a health plan. For example, if a
risk-adjustment method relied on a person’s past use of
health services to predict future use, plans would have less
incentive to control their enrollees’ drug spending.
Most risk-adjustment methods available today (for predict-
ing the use of health services other than drugs) depend on
data about a person’s previous use of services.2 Even then, the
1. For a review of risk-adjustment methods, see Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation, Changes in Health Care Financing and
Organization Program, Risk Adjustment:  A Key to Changing
Incentives in the Health Insurance Market (Washington, D.C.:
Alpha Center, March 1997), available at http://hcfo.net/pdf/
riskreport.pdf.
2. The risk-adjustment method in place for Medicare+Choice
plans during the 2000-2003 period is called the principal in-
patient diagnostic cost group method. That method identifies
high-cost beneficiaries for a year on the basis of the principal
inpatient diagnosis assigned to them during an inpatient hospital
stay the previous year. The statistical relationship between that
diagnosis and total spending on Medicare services the following
year is used to calculate a risk score for the beneficiary. Thus, an
assignment of elevated risk depends on a patient’s entering a
hospital.  In 2004, the Medicare+Choice program will move to
a risk-adjustment method that uses data from outpatient hospi-
tal and physician visits as well as from inpatient hospital stays.
available methods predict only a small part of the variation
in different people’s use of services.3
It might be possible to develop a more accurate risk-adjust-
ment method for prescription drugs than for other health
services (especially hospital care), because people’s drug
spending is more stable from year to year. In addition, there
would not be the long lag in data collection that exists for
other Medicare claims; data on drug utilization would be
available more quickly through the electronic claims technol-
ogy developed by pharmacy benefit managers. Still, by giving
plans that did less to manage drug utilization a higher risk
score for their enrollees, a risk-adjustment method based on
use could undermine incentives for cost control.
Integrating risk adjustment into the design of a Medicare
drug benefit would require finding a way to make additional
payments to plans for high-cost enrollees on a prospective
basis. One approach would be to adjust the government’s
share of the plan’s premium, similar to the approach now
used in the Medicare+Choice program. Another method
would be to provide “risk” subsidies using an administrative
mechanism similar to the one that would be used to provide
low-income subsidies to drug plans.
Another issue is how additional risk-adjustment payments
would be counted in reaching reinsurance thresholds (in
proposals that call for reinsurance). Thresholds could be
raised to take such payments into account. The thresholds
could be different for different diagnoses or could be applied
to a plan’s total costs rather than to costs for individuals. As
risk adjustment was refined over time, reinsurance payments
could be phased out.
That method will continue to assign risk scores that are based on
the relationship between a diagnosis and total spending on Med-
icare services the following year.
3. For a recent comparison of methods for assigning health risks,
see Robert B. Cumming and others, A Comparative Analysis of
Claims-Based Methods of Health Risk Assessment for Commercial
Populations (Schaumburg, Ill.: Society of Actuaries, May 2002),
available at www.soa.org/sections/riskadjfinal/report1.pdf.
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federal government. Indeed, the four proposals discussed
in Chapter 4 would cost the government between $195
billion and $512 billion during their first eight years, the
Congressional Budget Office estimates. Moreover, Medi-
care spending is expected to soar over the next three de-
cades as the baby-boom generation becomes eligible for
the program.
For all of those reasons, controlling costs is a key problem
in designing a Medicare drug benefit. The size of that
problem depends on the extent of the benefits offered
under the drug program.
As noted earlier, the level of coverage that is provided is
the most important determinant of the overall cost of the
benefit. The main reason is that more-generous coverage
shifts more of the burden of paying for drugs from the
consumer to the drug plan. Another reason is that by
lowering the effective price that people must pay for a
prescription, new or better drug coverage encourages en-
rollees to use more, or more costly, drugs than they would
otherwise. The more extensive the coverage (the lower the
deductible, the required cost sharing, and the catastrophic
stop-loss limit), the greater the stimulus to demand for
prescription drugs—and the greater the burden on cost
management to restrict that growth in demand.
The effect of the Medicare benefit on drug spending
would depend not only on the structure of the benefit but
also on the drug coverage that enrollees receive now—and
might continue to receive—from other sources. For the
one-quarter of Medicare beneficiaries without drug cover-
age, demand for prescription drugs would surely rise
when they enrolled in the program because they would be
paying less for at least some of their drugs. The size of
that increase in demand would depend directly on the
structure of the benefit.
For the three-quarters of beneficiaries who already have
some public or private drug coverage, the effect on their
use of prescription drugs would be more complicated.
Their demand would increase only if Medicare’s benefit
was more comprehensive than, or was supplemented by,
the coverage they now have. If the Medicare benefit was
less comprehensive than their current coverage, their
demand for drugs could decline, but only if the Medicare
benefit completely replaced all other coverage. (For more
details of how different kinds of supplemental coverage
would interact with a Medicare drug benefit, see Box 2).
Active management of the Medicare drug benefit could
encourage the use of fewer or less-costly drugs. Most re-
cent proposals assume that the benefit would be adminis-
tered by entities that have the capabilities of pharmacy
benefit managers, which most employment-based health
plans use to administer and manage their prescription
drug benefits.  In recent years, private-sector health plans
have increasingly refined their cost-sharing rules so that
enrollees are encouraged to buy less-expensive drugs and
to fill prescriptions through pharmacies in their network
or through mail-order facilities (when that form of dis-
pensing is more efficient).
The degree to which PBMs or other entities could effec-
tively control Medicare drug costs would depend on their
having both the authority and the incentive to aggres-
sively use the various tools at their disposal. Key among
those cost-management tools are formularies and related
approaches to steer demand for drugs to preferred prod-
ucts. (For a description of some of those approaches used
in the private sector, see Appendix A.)
In addition, requiring benefit managers to assume some
insurance risk for the benefits they pay out and allowing
multiple entities to compete for enrollees on the basis of
premiums and reimbursements would give managers
greater incentive to use the tools they have at hand to
hold down spending (although both of those approaches
would entail some costs). Even the most effective benefit
management, however, would not keep the prices of some
drugs from rising under a Medicare drug program.
Cost-Management Tools  
In general, a trade-off exists between enrollees’ ability to
easily obtain the drugs of their choice and a plan’s effec-
tiveness at managing drug spending. Aggressive use of
formularies, preferred-drug systems, generic-pricing sys-
tems, pharmacy networks, mail-order pharmacies (when
they are less costly), disease management, and physician
and patient education can alter the number and kinds of
drugs used and lower the price at which they are acquired
from manufacturers and pharmacies. All of those tools, to
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How a Medicare Drug Benefit Would Interact with Supplemental Drug Coverage
Roughly three out of four Medicare beneficiaries have drug
coverage through such sources as employment-based health
plans for retirees, state programs (including Medicaid), and
individually purchased medigap policies. How those supple-
mental sources of coverage would operate after the introduc-
tion of a Medicare drug program would determine the extent
to which the Medicare benefit stimulated demand for pre-
scription drugs. It would also affect the ability of the bene-
fit’s administrators to use cost-management tools effectively.
Effect on People with Employment-Based Plans
Some beneficiaries who already have drug coverage through
their employer could lose that coverage if a Medicare drug
program was created. In recent years, employers have re-
duced the share of premiums they pay for retirees and, in
some cases, have eliminated health benefits for retirees en-
tirely. That trend could accelerate if a drug benefit was
added to Medicare.
Employment-based drug coverage is typically more generous
than the coverage envisioned under most of the recent pro-
posals for Medicare. Thus, people who lost employment-
based coverage might have an incentive to spend less on
drugs under Medicare than they do now, because they would
be paying more of the costs themselves.
Employers who kept a drug benefit for retirees would most
likely provide it as a supplement to Medicare’s coverage, as
they already do for coverage of physician and hospital care.
They would require beneficiaries to enroll in the Medicare
drug program to retain their private coverage. The employ-
ment-based plan would probably reimburse beneficiaries for
any difference between what it would have covered and what
Medicare would cover. (For example, a plan that had no
deductible might pay for beneficiaries’ drug purchases below
the deductible amount in Medicare.) Enrollees who contin-
ued to have access to generous supplemental coverage would
have limited incentive to curb their drug spending under
Medicare, regardless of the design of the benefit.
Effect on People in State Programs  
Beneficiaries eligible for Medicaid or state-run pharmaceuti-
cal assistance programs would also have little reason to alter
their spending on drugs. State Medicaid agencies would
most likely enroll beneficiaries with dual eligibility in the
Medicare drug program, since doing so would reduce the
agencies’ costs. (Those costs would decline because the pre-
mium for the Medicare drug benefit, which would be based
on the average cost of all participants in the benefit, would
probably be lower than the average cost of drugs for dual
eligibles. If the federal government subsidized any of Medi-
care’s drug premium, state Medicaid costs would decrease
even more.) Like retiree health plans, Medicaid would sup-
plement Medicare’s drug coverage.
The Congressional Budget Office expects that state-based
pharmaceutical assistance programs for low-income seniors
would quickly be refocused once a Medicare drug benefit
was in place. If the new Medicare benefit did not include
premium and cost-sharing assistance for the programs’ target
groups, those programs might be redesigned to “wrap
around” (supplement) Medicare, just as Medicaid would.
Thus, a Medicare drug benefit would probably have little
impact on those beneficiaries’ demand for drugs, and the
wraparound coverage could undermine any incentive to con-
trol costs that was built into the structure of the Medicare
drug benefit.
Effect on People with Individual Drug Coverage  
Only a small percentage of Medicare beneficiaries have pri-
vate medigap policies that include drug insurance. As noted
in Chapter 1, the drug coverage provided by those policies is
expensive and limited, with annual benefits capped at either
$1,250 or $3,000. Since medigap premiums are not subsi-
dized and the plans have higher administrative costs than a
Medicare plan probably would, medigap enrollees could get
drug coverage through Medicare at lower cost. Thus, medi-
gap plans with drug coverage as now structured would prob-
ably disappear, and new medigap plans (if allowed) would be
developed to wrap around the Medicare drug benefit. Those
wraparound provisions would stimulate demand for drugs
and weaken the ability of Medicare to control costs. Con-
versely, prohibiting new medigap plans from offering drug
coverage would help keep demand from rising.
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one degree or another, work by influencing physicians’ or
consumers’ choices about what drug to prescribe or where
to fill a prescription.
Proposals that limit the scope of cost-management tools
available to benefit managers would reduce the potential
for controlling costs and demand. As an example of such
limits, some recent proposals would require benefit man-
agers to reimburse enrollees for a nonformulary drug if
the prescribing physician certified that the drug was med-
ically necessary. Other proposals would require that for-
mularies include at least two drugs in each therapeutic
class. Still others would limit the ability of benefit manag-
ers to exclude pharmacies from their network contracts.
Having a single PBM administer the Medicare drug bene-
fit in each region, as some proposals envision, could pose
problems for the use of formularies. If each PBM estab-
lished its own formulary, enrollees in the Medicare drug
program would have to pay different prices for the same
drug solely on the basis of where they live. Those differ-
ences might not prove acceptable politically. Conversely,
if Medicare adopted a nationwide formulary, that formu-
lary would probably not be very restrictive, because na-
tionwide exclusion from the Medicare market could
threaten the profitability—and even the survival—of
some drug manufacturers. (If the regions were large
enough, exclusion of a drug from the formulary of even
one region would also have significant financial implica-
tions for some manufacturers and might be difficult to
sustain politically.)
Compromise approaches—such as limiting reimburse-
ments for nonpreferred drugs only to the amount that
would be paid for a therapeutically equivalent preferred
drug—would probably make systems that steer patients
toward certain drugs more acceptable under a single-PBM
design. Such approaches could also save money if the
cost-sharing requirements adopted under a proposal were
flexible enough (see Appendix A).
An important limit on the ability of any benefit manager
to control the costs of a Medicare drug benefit is the fact
that some enrollees might continue to have extensive drug
coverage through public programs or private health plans
(see Box 2). If a supplemental insurer paid the bulk of an
enrollee’s drug copayment regardless of whether the drug
was on the PBM’s formulary or preferred-drug list, the
usefulness of formularies and similar cost containment
methods would diminish. The leverage that PBMs might
have with pharmacies or manufacturers would be weak-
ened as a result.
Insurance Risk and Competition  
The incentive to control spending would be strong if the
administering entity bore substantial insurance risk for
delivering the benefit at or near some target cost. That
situation would arise if the entity had to pay part or all of
the extra cost when per-enrollee spending exceeded the
target—and, conversely, got to keep at least part of the
savings when that spending was less than the target. The
incentive to curb costs would be even greater if the enti-
ties administering drug plans also had to compete with
each other for enrollees on the basis of premiums and
out-of-pocket drug costs. All other things being equal,
enrollees would reward lower-cost plans with their busi-
ness.
Although insurance risk and competition would encour-
age cost containment, they would also give plans more
incentive to use management tools to achieve favorable
selection than would be the case if a single plan was
awarded a contract for all enrollees in a region. All plans
would probably adopt similar tools as a defense against
the use of such tactics by their competitors. However,
there may be natural limits to the use of aggressive man-
agement tools by competing plans, because enrollees
would choose among plans not only on the basis of pre-
miums and costs but also on the basis of quality and ser-
vice.
Some policymakers question the importance of competi-
tion and the assumption of insurance risk as ways to save
money from managing a drug benefit. In the private sec-
tor, PBMs typically do not assume any insurance risk for
the drug benefits they administer, but they are often given
broad authority to use an array of management tools on
behalf of a plan. They may also be subject to having a
bonus added to—or a penalty subtracted from—their
administrative fee according to how well they meet spe-
cific performance goals. A similar approach was envi-
sioned in some of the recent proposals for a Medicare
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drug benefit, which called for a single PBM selected peri-
odically to serve each region, with all of the insurance risk
borne by Medicare.
Two important differences exist, however, between how
employment-based health plans and the government
might use a PBM to control costs. First, proposals for a
Medicare drug benefit generally include statutory limits
on the management tools that Medicare could require of
PBMs. Employment-based plans, by contrast, can more
easily change cost control strategies as circumstances dic-
tate.
Second, and more important, the federal workers who
would make decisions for the Medicare drug program
face different incentives than private companies and their
decisionmakers do. Most private employers who offer
health coverage operate in a competitive marketplace,
which requires them to keep costs down so they can price
their products competitively while maintaining generous
enough benefits to attract skilled workers. Medicare faces
pressure to deliver promised benefits to enrollees; its in-
centives for cost containment are probably not as strong
as those of a private employer.
Medicare drug proposals that call for multiple risk-bear-
ing plans to compete for enrollees’ business, with few
restrictions on cost control mechanisms, have the greatest
potential to constrain drug costs through management.
However, the savings in drug costs would be partly offset
by two kinds of additional costs:  the cost of bearing in-
surance risk, and the marketing costs that competitive
plans would have to incur. In the end, the degree to
which those added expenses put a drag on cost manage-
ment would depend on the details of the benefit design.
The Insurance-Risk Premium. A modest cost increase
will occur whenever a drug program requires a private
entity to bear insurance risk. In general, riskier enterprises
need higher dollar returns to operate than less-risky ones
do, because unless investors are compensated for bearing
the extra risk, investment in those enterprises will dry
up.13 All private firms face risk in the normal course of
doing business (such as the risk of misjudging labor costs
or the strength of competition). Those normal business
risks are not likely to differ among proposals for a Medi-
care drug benefit. But a design that requires PBMs or
other entities administering the benefit to bear insurance
risk imposes a higher cost on such entities than does a de-
sign that leaves insurance risk in the hands of the govern-
ment. That additional cost is referred to as the insurance-
risk premium.
One source of insurance risk is uncertainty about such
things as the increase in demand that would arise from
better drug coverage or unexpected scientific advances
that could boost drug spending. Another source of insur-
ance risk is the possibility of adverse selection. If there
was a single Medicare drug plan in each region, and if a
large share of the eligible Medicare population enrolled in
the drug program, that source of risk would be minimal.
With multiple plans, however, the risk of adverse selec-
tion becomes a significant concern. As noted earlier, that
concern would be greatest in the early years of the pro-
gram, when plans would have little data from which to
predict their enrollees’ drug spending or the benefits of-
fered by their competitors.
Assessing the size of the insurance-risk premium is diffi-
cult. On the one hand, growth in the use of new drugs
can be hard to predict, and the possibility of ending up
with enrollees who have above-average costs is worrisome.
On the other hand, traditional financial theory suggests
that the premium should be small or even zero. The rea-
son is that new Medicare drug plans would most likely
become additional holdings in the diversified portfolios of
large investors. Those diversified portfolios would be
subject to financial risks for the economy as a whole but
would be protected from the idiosyncratic risk of any par-
ticular investment. From the point of view of an investor
holding such a portfolio, the firm-specific risks of Medi-
care drug plans would balance out the risks associated
13. One possible response to risk is to take actions to reduce it.  For
example, companies might take out insurance against uncertainties
in the market, or they might accumulate cash reserves to deal with
contingencies. Such actions would directly increase the costs of
doing business, which would mean higher prices, whereas a firm
that declined those approaches would have to deliver higher re-
turns to investors, which would also mean higher prices.
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with other firms. Unless the insurance risks of the drug
plans were correlated with the general financial risks of
the economy, the risk premium for drug plans would be
small.
In practice, however, insurance risk would probably give
rise to real costs, which would be reflected in the premi-
ums charged by competing plans. For instance, in an
effort to avoid losses, managers might buy reinsurance,
which is generally priced above its expected payouts in
order to cover the reinsurers’ own selection risks as well as
their business costs. Managers might also try to accumu-
late reserves to cover possible losses. Although those re-
serves could be invested in interest-bearing assets, holding
them would still entail costs.
In short, the risk premium would be an economic cost of
any drug benefit that required a private entity to bear
insurance risk. Uncertainty about trends in demand or
technology would impose a cost on the entity that would
require compensation. The risk premium would be
higher for designs that envisioned competitive plans than
for one in which a single plan bore insurance risk. Of
course, the alternative—having the federal government
bear insurance risk—would increase the government’s
uncertainty about its spending in any enrollment period
and thus make budgeting for the Medicare drug program
more difficult.
Plans’ Marketing Costs. Competition would introduce
additional expenses associated with marketing to and en-
rolling Medicare beneficiaries, which would not arise if a
single plan administered the drug benefit in each area. In
a competitive system, the government would inform ben-
eficiaries that Medicare drug coverage was available to
them. The competing plans would then have to provide
specific information about their plans to beneficiaries. If
plans were also responsible for enrolling beneficiaries and
collecting their premiums, the cost of carrying out those
administrative functions would be higher than under a
single-plan system. Most single-plan designs would prob-
ably adopt the relatively seamless administrative process
used for Part B of Medicare, in which beneficiaries are
automatically enrolled unless they decline coverage, and
uniform premium amounts are deducted from beneficia-
ries’ monthly Social Security checks.
The extra administrative costs associated with competi-
tion could be reduced if plans were responsible for mar-
keting but the government administered the enrollment
and premium-collection processes. A uniform process
would benefit from economies of scale. Moreover, the
infrastructure for determining eligibility, enrolling peo-
ple, and collecting premiums already exists in the Medi-
care program.
Effects on Drug Prices  
Even with active cost management by plans, prices for
some prescription drugs would rise as a result of a Medi-
care drug benefit. As noted above, insurance stimulates
demand for covered drugs by reducing their cost to bene-
ficiaries. If the pharmaceutical industry were perfectly
competitive, manufacturers would probably respond to
higher demand not by raising prices but by increasing
production at little additional cost, at least in the long
run. (Short-run shortages of supply might lead to higher
prices, but competition would ensure that drug compa-
nies would invest in new production capacity to meet the
higher demand.)
The pharmaceutical industry is far from perfectly compet-
itive, however. Drugs are unique among health care prod-
ucts and services in that many are subject to unusually
strong intellectual property rights, which protect their
manufacturers from competition. Those rights stem not
only from patents but also from the exclusive rights to sell
drugs that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act grants to
drugmakers in certain situations. The Food and Drug
Administration, whose primary responsibility is to ensure
the safety and efficacy of drugs sold in the United States,
also helps enforce those intellectual property protections.
As long as a drug is protected from imitation by patent or
other exclusive marketing rights, its manufacturer has a
legal and well-enforced monopoly over the product.
In the case of many drugs, companies’ monopoly power is
limited because close substitutes for the drug are available.
For example, among the widely used cholesterol-lowering
agents known as statins, five different chemical entities,
each protected by patents, have similar modes of action
and effectiveness.14 As a result, companies that sell those
14. Institute of Medicine, Description and Analysis of the VA National
Formulary (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2000).
CHAPTER THREE PROBLEMS IN DESIGNING A MEDICARE DRUG BENEFIT 29
drugs often spend considerable sums to advertise and pro-
mote their products and must consider the competition
in setting prices.
Occasionally, though, a specific drug offers unique clini-
cal benefits of such magnitude that the only limit on its
price is consumers’ willingness or ability to pay.15 Insur-
ance effectively increases consumers’ willingness or ability
to pay for covered drugs, so a generous drug benefit—
with low cost-sharing requirements, high benefit caps, or
low catastrophic stop-loss limits—would make newly in-
sured patients more tolerant of high prices. If a unique
drug with major clinical benefits had a target population
composed mainly of Medicare beneficiaries, a new benefit
with a low catastrophic stop-loss limit could cause the
drug’s manufacturer to raise the current price or enter the
market with a high launch price. (Medicare would have
few ways to prevent very high prices for such drugs, apart
from imposing direct price controls or threatening to
deny or delay coverage. However, the threat of such con-
straints could increase uncertainty about the market for
new drugs and thus discourage investment in pharmaceu-
tical research and development.)16
Such exceptional cases aside, the most likely effect of a
Medicare drug benefit would be only moderate price
increases, and only for drugs with patent protection or
exclusive marketing rights. One reason is that Medicare
beneficiaries make up just part of the prescription drug
market. A manufacturer who wanted to raise prices would
have to weigh the higher revenue available from newly
covered Medicare beneficiaries against the potential for
lost market share among other buyers. A second reason is
that since many Medicare patients have good drug cover-
age now, the effect on drug prices of even the most gener-
ous Medicare benefit would be diluted (because drug cov-
erage is already reflected in current or expected prices).
Nevertheless, the potential for manufacturers of patent-
protected drugs to raise prices underscores the importance
of giving the entities charged with managing the benefit
both the incentive and the authority to use cost-manage-
ment tools.  If PBMs or health plans could actively man-
age drug utilization through formularies or other strate-
gies, they could closely scrutinize drugmakers’ claims of
clinical superiority. And by exploiting opportunities for
price competition, they could hold pricing power in
check when close substitutes existed.17 Conversely, if
PBMs or health plans were discouraged from actively
managing the Medicare drug benefit in those ways, there
would be fewer limits on price increases.
Administrative Feasibility
Most recent proposals for a stand-alone Medicare drug
benefit envision having private entities administer the
benefit, but they differ markedly in the functions that
such entities would perform. Some proposals would re-
quire those administrators not only to play the roles that
PBMs do in the private sector but also to compete for en-
rollees, bear insurance risk, and cope with federal (and
possibly state) regulation of their activities. The willing-
ness and ability of private entities to participate under
those conditions would affect the speed with which a
Medicare drug program could be implemented nation-
wide and its ultimate cost.
Plans’ Participation in a Single-Plan, No-Risk Design
In a design (such as the Clinton Administration’s plan)
that envisions a single administrative entity for each part
of the country, with the government bearing insurance
risk, entities such as PBMs would compete for contracts
to manage the drug benefit for everyone who enrolled in
an area. The government would presumably issue a re-
quest for proposals for each region and award a contract
to a single entity in that region using a bidding process.
The bidding would determine how much the government
15. One drug with unique clinical benefits is alglucerase, which re-
places an enzyme that is deficient in people who have Gaucher dis-
ease, a frequently disabling and sometimes fatal condition if not
treated. A single company currently has the exclusive right to mar-
ket alglucerase. For a description of the disease and therapies, see
the Web site of Genzyme Therapeutics (www.genzyme
therapeutics.com/cerezyme).
16. See Congressional Budget Office, How Health Care Reform Affects
Pharmaceutical Research and Development (June 1994).
17. Even the first drug in a new therapeutic class can soon face compe-
tition from similar drugs or therapies. The introduction of a new
class of pain relievers, known as Cox-2 inhibitors, is a case in
point. The first molecule in the class was approved for marketing
in the United States at the end of 1998. A second drug was ap-
proved only a few months later, in May 1999. Similar drugs are
currently awaiting approval for marketing in the United States.
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paid each entity for processing claims on a fee-for-service,
no-risk basis.
The administrative functions required in a single-plan,
no-risk design would be similar to the functions that
PBMs now perform for employment-based health plans.
Although certain features of that type of Medicare drug
program could discourage some PBMs from bidding for
contracts, it is likely that several large PBMs would be
willing to participate. With the chance to manage drug
claims for millions of Medicare beneficiaries at stake,
PBMs would have an incentive to bid for contracts from
the beginning, because the winning bidder in the initial
competition would be awarded an exclusive, potentially
multiyear contract and could thus have a competitive
advantage in future bidding.18 Managing the Medicare
benefit might also give PBMs an advantage in competing
for contracts with employment-based plans, because it
would simplify the coordination of benefits for retirees.
Larger PBMs, with the infrastructure to administer broad
pharmacy networks and negotiate with drugmakers for re-
bates, might have a competitive advantage over smaller
PBMs. Thus, administration of the Medicare drug benefit
might end up being concentrated among a few large
PBMs. Such concentration would not necessarily lead to
higher costs, since bigger PBMs might be able to achieve
economies of scale that smaller ones could not. But unless
enough potential bidders survived and the contracts were
rebid periodically, the approach of having a single re-
gional benefit manager could eventually reduce incentives
for contractors to operate efficiently and for the govern-
ment to continue to achieve savings through competitive
contracting. The ultimate impact on Medicare costs is
uncertain: it would depend largely on the dynamics of the
competitive-bidding process used to award contracts.
Plans’ Participation in a Competitive, Risk-Based Design
The question of participation is more complex in a design
in which multiple entities would be competing for en-
rollees in a region and those entities bore the insurance
risk. Adopting risk-based payment would require PBMs
to change their current business model to put more em-
phasis on cost control. (In the private sector, PBMs agree
contractually to meet certain performance targets, such as
specific price discounts and utilization rates, but they are
not at risk for total spending. Employers or insurance
companies have the responsibility for managing enroll-
ment, bearing risks, and complying with state and federal
regulations that govern health plans.)  The need for
greater emphasis on cost control under a risk-based ap-
proach would require some PBMs to restructure them-
selves and could delay or discourage their participation.
For example, to compete as risk-bearing entities, most
PBMs would probably need to develop partnerships with
insurance companies and seek state licenses. Alternatively,
PBMs could offer their traditional benefit-management
services to insurance companies that would provide the
Medicare drug coverage.
Another barrier to plans’ participation in a competitive
design would be uncertainty about adverse selection, par-
ticularly interplan adverse selection. Especially in the early
years of the program, plans might be unable to gauge how
much interplan-selection risk they would encounter or to
know how effective their strategies to counter such risk
would be. Managers might take a “wait and see” approach
to participation. Even if plans modified their design to
mitigate adverse selection, as described earlier, the num-
ber of competing plans might be fewer in the initial years.
Concerns About Regulatory Changes. Insurers have
stated that they would be reluctant to offer Medicare drug
plans out of concern that the federal government or state
governments might modify the rules of enrollment after
the fact.19 In particular, they worry that over time, the
Congress might allow exceptions to one-time enrollment
because of pressure from constituents, thus undercutting
the effectiveness of one-time enrollment in preventing
adverse selection. Insurers have also expressed concern
that state regulators might try to alter benefit packages or
set other requirements that would impose unworkable
limits on them.
18. See CBO’s estimate of the Clinton Administration’s prescription
drug proposal in Congressional Budget Office, CBO’s Analysis of
the Health Insurance Initiatives in the Mid-Session Review (July 18,
2000).
19. See the testimony of Charles N. Kahn III, President, Health Insur-
ance Association of America, before the House Committee on
Ways and Means, June 13, 2000.
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Actions by states to license and regulate drug plans could
have a significant impact on plans’ initial participation in
the Medicare drug program. State insurance regulators
might issue new rules for licensing such plans, including
standards for financial solvency, that could vary widely
from state to state. The time needed to obtain a license in
each state would also vary. In addition, the relative speed
with which states put requirements in place could affect
start-up costs for plans trying to obtain licenses in multi-
ple states. Moreover, depending on the type of prescrip-
tion drug benefit enacted, state insurance regulations
might affect the tools a plan could use to control drug
costs, the procedures for enrollees to appeal decisions
about coverage and to settle grievances, and the premiums
that Medicare beneficiaries would pay for drug coverage.
(For more information about current state laws that could
affect Medicare drug plans, see Box 3.)
One way to work within those laws and possibly encour-
age the formation of nationwide plans would be to enact
a federal preemption of state laws governing Medicare
drug plans.20 In addition, the federal administrator of the
Medicare drug program could be given power to grant
waivers of state insurance regulations. Waivers could be
granted if states failed to process license applications
quickly enough or if they imposed other barriers to licens-
ing, such as requiring plans to meet more-stringent sol-
vency standards than those established by federal regula-
tion.
Participation by Medicare+Choice or Public Plans.
One type of plan would be likely to participate from the
beginning in a competitive, risk-based design: Medicare+
Choice plans. Those plans have the marketing, enroll-
ment, and customer-service infrastructure to compete for
enrollees. They also have experience bearing insurance
risk and working within the regulatory structure of the
Medicare program. Providing drug coverage to Medicare
beneficiaries could be done seamlessly through M+C
plans as an enhancement of their basic benefits. In that
case, however, drug coverage would be available only to
beneficiaries who enrolled in M+C plans for their basic
Medicare benefits.
In some areas, it is possible that only one plan or even no
plans would participate in the drug program. Without
multiple plans in a region, the full benefits of competition
would not be realized. If that happened, the government
might have to provide its own public plan as a fallback in
those areas to ensure a competitive benefit nationwide or,
alternatively, provide additional financial incentives for
private plans to operate in those regions. Fallback plans
would be very vulnerable to interplan adverse selection in
any region in which there was also a stand-alone drug
plan or a Medicare+Choice plan. If the fallback plan was
less aggressive than other plans in managing costs, the
federal government could end up paying more, on aver-
age, in areas requiring such direct intervention.
Effects on Other Parts of Medicare
Adding a stand-alone prescription drug benefit to Medi-
care would have ripple effects on the rest of the program.
With greater access to prescription drugs, some Medicare
beneficiaries might use fewer health care services; in other
cases, though, use of health care could increase. (The evi-
dence that exists from past studies is inconclusive.)  In all,
costs for other Medicare services would probably not
change significantly.
A drug benefit would also affect enrollment in Medicare’s
managed care plans (Medicare+Choice) by diluting one of
their current competitive advantages—prescription drug
coverage. However, M+C plans might be more likely to
continue participating in Medicare because they would
receive payment for their drug coverage rather than hav-
ing to finance it themselves.
Impact on Other Medicare Services
By reducing financial barriers to the purchase of prescrip-
tion drugs, a Medicare drug benefit would free up income
for elderly people to use on other things, including addi-
tional health care. And by lowering the out-of-pocket
price of prescription drugs for some enrollees, the benefit
would stimulate demand for more, and possibly more
costly, prescription drugs than before. Greater access to
outpatient prescription drugs would improve the health
20. Alternatively, regulatory functions might be shared between the
federal and state governments. For example, states might issue in-
surance licenses, and the federal government would regulate rates
and benefits.
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State Insurance Laws That Affect Prescription Drug Plans
A Medicare drug program that failed to preempt state
insurance laws would subject participating plans to a
wide array of regulations. Those regulations would
make it more costly for plans to enter some markets,
which could hinder the development of regional drug
plans.
Many states have laws that would limit plans’ ability to
use certain tools—such as formularies and selective
contracting with pharmacists—to control drug costs.
As of December 2001, 26 states required health plans
to have procedures whereby an enrollee can request
coverage for drugs not on the plan’s formulary. Eight
states required plans, in certain cases, to continue cov-
ering drugs that are removed from the formulary.1 In
addition, 17 states had “any willing pharmacy” laws,
which require managed care plans to contract with any
pharmacy that is willing to meet the terms and condi-
tions of the contract, and 16 states had “freedom of
choice” laws, which prohibit plans from restricting en-
rollees’ choice of pharmacies in return for a price dis-
count. (Nine states had both types of laws.)2 Plans
administering the Medicare drug benefit in those states
would face higher costs, which could result in higher
premiums or cost-sharing amounts for enrollees.
Many states also regulate the procedures for enrollees in
managed care plans to appeal decisions about coverage
1. Blue Cross Blue Shield Association, State Legislative Health Care
and Insurance Issues: 2001 Survey of Plans (Washington, D.C.:
BCBSA, 2001).
2. Health Policy Tracking Service, 2001 State by State Guide to
Managed Care Law (Washington, D.C.: National Conference of
State Legislatures, 2001).
and to settle grievances.  At the end of 2001, 41 states
and the District of Columbia had laws mandating the
establishment of an independent or external review pro-
cess for consumers to appeal certain adverse judg-
ments.3 Laws in nine states allow an enrollee to hold a
health plan accountable for its treatment decisions and
to sue the plan in the appropriate civil court.4
Other state laws would affect the premiums that plans
could charge for Medicare drug coverage. Ten states
have enacted community-rating legislation, which re-
quires health insurers to charge policyholders the same
premium regardless of their health status or history of
claims.5 Twenty-nine states have laws that require plans
selling health insurance in some markets to obtain prior
approval of their rates from the state’s insurance com-
mission.6
3. Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, Assessing State External Re-
view Programs and the Effects of Pending Federal Patients’ Rights
Legislation (Menlo Park, Calif.: Kaiser Family Foundation,
2002).
4. Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, Key Characteristics of State
Managed Care Organization Liability Laws: Current Status and
Experience (Menlo Park, Calif.: Kaiser Family Foundation,
2001).
5. AARP Public Policy Institute, Reforming the Health Care System:
State Profiles 1998 (Washington, D.C.: AARP, 2000), and per-
sonal communication to the Congressional Budget Office by
staff members of AARP, January 17, 2001.
6. National Association of Insurance Commissioners, NAIC’s Com-
pendium of State Laws on Insurance Topics (Kansas City, Mo.:
NAIC, 2000), and personal communication to the Congres-
sional Budget Office by staff members of the National Associa-
tion of Insurance Commissioners, January 17, 2001.
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of some seniors, which could reduce their use of hospitals
and other services.
However, it is not clear that total costs for other Medicare
services would decline. For one thing, greater use of
drugs, especially in an older population, would increase
the chances of side effects, allergic reactions, medication
errors, and other adverse events—which could lead to
new or longer visits to hospitals, emergency rooms, and
other health care services.21 To try to limit the frequency
of adverse drug events for people on chronic therapies,
physicians often require periodic visits and lab tests, and
those precautions also raise costs.
A Medicare drug benefit could have a beneficial effect,
however, on certain kinds of adverse drug events—those
stemming from inappropriate dosing and interactions
between drugs. Under most proposals, the benefit would
be managed by entities that use electronic claims systems,
which can identify and warn patients or prescribing phy-
sicians of potentially dangerous interactions when drugs
are dispensed. That feature would be newly available not
only to enrollees who now lack drug coverage but also to
enrollees whose current coverage is not administered
through such systems.
The evidence that is available to gauge how access to drug
coverage affects health care costs is difficult to interpret.
Few research studies address the question directly; rather,
they examine the effects of a specific drug or class of
drugs on health costs. Only a handful of studies have
looked at the impact of drug coverage on health costs,
and they have focused only on the most vulnerable and
chronically ill subgroups of the population. Taken as a
whole, the evidence from those studies is inconclusive.
Some recent research suggests that using more and newer
drugs may reduce the use of other health care services; but
other studies suggest that modest increases in financial
access to drugs for elderly patients may not produce such
a reduction. (For a more-detailed review of the research
findings, see Appendix B.)  New evidence may become
available in the next year as researchers complete evalua-
tions of state pharmaceutical assistance programs for the
elderly.
Even if a drug benefit led to net savings in other Medicare
costs, those savings would probably be relatively small, for
two reasons. First, beneficiaries with Medicaid or employ-
ment-based insurance already have better coverage than
would be available through many proposed Medicare
drug benefits, so they would see little change in their drug
use. And for their part, Medicare beneficiaries who lack
drug coverage already use a significant quantity of pre-
scription drugs. (On average, they filled 25 prescriptions
in 1999, compared with 32 for Medicare beneficiaries
who had drug coverage, CBO estimates.)22 The addi-
tional, or more expensive, drugs that they might use as a
result of gaining coverage would probably provide less-
dramatic or less-immediate improvements in their health
than do the drugs they are currently taking.
Second, any improvements in health would probably
delay rather than prevent the use of expensive health care
services. Delaying the onset of disability or end-of-life
care is unquestionably a good thing, but it also means
that what is saved in one year may be spent a few years
later. Moreover, to the extent that a drug benefit helps
people live longer, they may consume more health care
over their remaining lifetime than they would have with-
out the benefit.
21. See, for example, H. Kaisu and others, “Inappropriate Drug Pre-
scribing in Home-Dwelling Elderly Patients,” Archives of Internal
Medicine, vol. 162 (August 12/26, 2002), pp. 1707-1712; R.R.
Aparasu and S.E. Fliginger, “Inappropriate Medication Prescribing
for the Elderly by Office-Based Physicians,” Annals of Pharmaco-
therapy, vol. 31, no. 7-8 (July-August 1997), pp. 823-829; and
General Accounting Office, Adverse Drug Events:  The Magnitude
of Health Risk Is Uncertain Because of Limited Incidence Data,
GAO/HEHS-00-21 (January 2000).
22. That estimate is based on the 1999 Medicare Current Beneficiary
Survey, with adjustments for underreporting and for use of drugs
by beneficiaries in nursing homes and other long-term care facili-
ties. 
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Impact on Medicare+Choice
As of August 2002, about 14 percent of Medicare benefi-
ciaries were enrolled in Medicare+Choice plans.23 In the
past, those managed care plans were attractive to enrollees
because they offered benefits beyond the basic Medicare
package—the most desirable of which was prescription
drug coverage. In recent years, however, changes in pay-
ment rates that have lagged behind growth in plans’ costs
have led some plans to withdraw from Medicare and
others to raise enrollees’ premiums or reduce drug cover-
age and other extra benefits. Consequently, enrollment in
Medicare+Choice fell by 1.4 percent in 2001 after grow-
ing by 4.8 percent the previous year.
Adding a prescription drug benefit to Medicare would
affect M+C plans in two ways. Plans that offer drug cov-
erage would receive payment for the value of that cover-
age rather than having to finance it from their savings on
administration or benefits. M+C plans have cited the
rising cost of prescription drugs and the lack of Medicare
payment for drug coverage—combined with the 1997
changes in payment rates—as reasons for dropping out of
Medicare. Additional payment to cover the cost of a pre-
scription drug benefit would help stabilize participation
by M+C plans (in the absence of other disincentives to
participate).
At the same time, the availability of drug coverage in
regular fee-for-service Medicare would remove one of the
principal incentives for new beneficiaries to select M+C
plans. Such plans would have to differentiate themselves
from fee-for-service Medicare through lower out-of-
pocket costs, smaller premiums, or bigger benefits. How-
ever, the universal availability of drug coverage could give
M+C plans a new competitive advantage over fee-for-
service Medicare:  because M+C plans provide the full
package of Medicare benefits for enrollees, they would
have greater flexibility than new plans that provided only
drug benefits to substitute medical services for prescrip-
tion drugs in a cost-effective manner.
23. Lori Achman and Marsha Gold, Medicare+Choice and Medicare
Beneficiaries: Monthly Tracking Report for August 2002, no. 42
(Washington, D.C.: Mathematica Policy Research, September 5,
2002).
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Cost Estimates for Specific Proposals
7he various design choices described in Chapters 2
and 3 have a significant impact on the costs of a proposed
Medicare drug benefit. The effects of those choices are
complex and interdependent. To illustrate the overall
impact, this chapter presents the Congressional Budget
Office’s cost estimates for four proposals, all of which
were developed at the time of the 106th Congress (1999
to 2000). Those proposals are:
 The drug benefit described in the Clinton Adminis-
tration’s June 2000 Mid-Session Review;
 The Robb amendment (introduced by Senator Charles
Robb as amendment 3598 to H.R. 4577);
 H.R. 4680 (introduced by Congressman William
Thomas), which passed the House of Representatives
in October 2000; and
 Breaux-Frist II (S. 2807, introduced by Senator John
Breaux).
Those proposals cover a broad spectrum of approaches
for delivering a Medicare drug benefit. For example, H.R.
4680 and Breaux-Frist II would have private-sector enti-
ties (such as pharmaceutical benefit management compa-
nies or health insurers) compete for enrollees and assume
insurance risk for their drug spending. By contrast, the
Clinton Administration’s proposal would have those en-
tities compete to be selected as the single nonrisk plan in
each region to administer the Medicare drug benefit. Like
H.R. 4680 and Breaux-Frist II, the Robb amendment
would have multiple plans compete for enrollees in each
area, but they would not bear insurance risk.1
To estimate the costs of a proposed Medicare drug bene-
fit, CBO uses a model that simulates how a given pro-
posal would affect the spending of a representative sample
of Medicare beneficiaries. The model contains detailed
information about beneficiaries’ spending for prescription
drugs and Medicare-covered services, their supplemental
insurance coverage (both public and private), their health
status, and their income.2 CBO’s cost estimates result
from the operation of that model; the effects of specific
design choices cannot be quantified independent of a
proposal’s complete design specifications.
The primary factor that determines the federal costs of a
given drug benefit is how much of enrollees’ current drug
spending the new Medicare benefit would cover. That
amount, in turn, depends on the structure of the coverage
and the number of people who would enroll. But CBO’s
1. Under the Robb amendment, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services could (but would not be required to) link a plan’s pay-
ments to certain performance standards proposed by the plan in its
bid to be allowed to offer the Medicare drug benefit.  Those stan-
dards could include cost control.  However, given the vagueness of
the proposal’s language, CBO has interpreted that provision as not
requiring plans to bear insurance risk.
2. The estimates in this chapter are based on data from Medicare
claims for 1999 and from the 1999 Medicare Current Beneficiary
Survey, projected forward using CBO’s March 2002 economic
assumptions and baseline projections of Medicare spending.
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estimates also assume that besides simply redistributing
who pays for drug spending, the new benefit would cause
enrollees to change their behavior. Some might fill more
prescriptions or use more brand-name drugs once they
gained better insurance coverage, thus increasing overall
drug spending. The new Medicare benefit might also give
manufacturers greater room to raise prices on certain
drugs (if enrollees became less sensitive to the price of
their prescriptions). Conversely, spending could fall if the
entities that administered the drug benefit made aggres-
sive use of cost-management tools, which can result in
substantial price discounts and changes in the mix of
drugs prescribed or purchased.
CBO’s Key Assumptions
The issues discussed in the previous chapters would affect
both the value of the drug benefit that enrollees receive
and its costs to the federal government. CBO’s approach
takes those issues into account through six key assump-
tions that are incorporated in the estimating model:
 Beneficiary participation rate—the percentage of Medi-
care beneficiaries who would enroll in the drug pro-
gram. CBO assumes that the beneficiary participation
rate is directly related to the share of total premium
costs subsidized by the government.3 The pool of po-
tential enrollees includes beneficiaries who currently
lack drug coverage, people who would use the new
Medicare benefit to replace their private drug coverage,
and those who would keep their private coverage as a
supplement to the new Medicare benefit.
 Price effect—the percentage increase in drug prices for
the Medicare population that would gradually occur as
a result of the new benefit. A benefit that covered a
larger share of enrollees’ total drug spending would
tend to generate greater price increases than less com-
prehensive benefit packages would. (Any mitigating ef-
fect of cost management on price increases is captured
in the cost-management factor described below.)
 Cost-management factor—a measure of a proposal’s
potential for reducing spending on drugs below what
would be spent by people whose purchases were not
managed. The cost-management factor represents the
net effect of an amalgam of price discounts and re-
bates, utilization controls, and other tools that a PBM
might use to hold down spending. CBO assumes that
PBMs would have greater incentive and ability to con-
trol spending under proposals in which they had to
compete for enrollees and assume insurance risk for
their spending and in which they had broad flexibility
to manage enrollees’ behavior through tools such as re-
strictive formularies.
 Induced demand—the increase in enrollees’ spending
on prescription drugs as a result of the insurance cov-
erage provided by the new Medicare benefit. CBO
assumes that enrollees’ drug spending would rise by
3 percent for each 10 percent drop in their out-of-
pocket costs under the benefit.4 As is the case with the
price effect, induced demand is directly related to the
relative generosity of the proposed drug coverage. The
overall effect on spending per enrollee is the net result
of induced demand, the price effect, and the cost-man-
agement factor.
 Marketing costs—the additional costs associated with
acquiring members and administering drug plans
when multiple plans must compete for enrollees in
each region. Those costs could be lower if plans used
standardized marketing materials that allowed poten-
tial enrollees to compare plans more easily, with Medi-
care providing general information about the available
choices. CBO assumes that marketing costs would be
fairly high in the early years of a Medicare drug pro-
gram because plans would need to make all Medicare
beneficiaries in their area aware of their services. In
later years, marketing costs would decline because
plans would focus on smaller numbers of people
(mainly those who were newly eligible for Medicare).
3. In CBO’s model, “premium costs” refers to the total value of the
benefits paid out plus the cost of administering the drug program.
4. In economists’ terms, CBO assumes that the elasticity of demand
for prescription drugs is -0.3.  As used in this study, “out-of-pocket
costs” include cost-sharing expenses but not an enrollee’s share of
premiums.
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 Risk-premium costs—a measure of the additional re-
sources required by private plans if they bear insurance
risk. Those resources could represent the pool of finan-
cial reserves needed to cover future drug claims if ben-
efit spending is higher than a plan anticipates, or the
price of private reinsurance that a plan would need in
order to limit its risk, or both. CBO assumes that the
risk premium would be higher in the initial years of a
Medicare drug program because plans would have
little data from which to predict the future cost of
their benefits.
Details of Four Recent Proposals
This section looks at the key assumptions that CBO used
for its cost estimates of four Medicare drug proposals
introduced during the 106th Congress. For the past few
years, when CBO has updated its 10-year projections of
drug spending by or for Medicare beneficiaries, it has also
updated its estimates for those proposals as a way to eval-
uate the results of its estimating models and reassess key
assumptions. The four proposals are particularly useful
for that effort because they represent a broad spectrum of
approaches in terms of both the scope of the benefit pack-
ages and the diversity of ways in which Medicare might
administer a drug program.
Because the four proposals were introduced several years
ago, their original versions would have started the drug
benefit in 2002 or 2003, giving Medicare two or three
years to set up the program. For purposes of the estimates
presented here, CBO assumes that each proposed benefit
would begin in 2005.
In spite of the shift in timing, CBO retained the propos-
als’ original values for deductibles, benefit caps, and limits
on out-of-pocket spending, rather than adjusting them
for inflation. For example, if a proposal called for a $250
deductible and a $5,000 stop-loss provision beginning in
2003, the estimates described here use those same values
of $250 and $5,000 for 2005. (Each of the proposals calls
for increasing the values of its benefit parameters after the
first year of the program, which CBO also does in its
estimates.) Keeping the same nominal values when drug
spending is growing makes a proposal’s deductible and
stop-loss amounts relatively more generous, whereas keep-
ing the same value for a cap on benefits makes a proposal
less so. As a result of that approach, most of the proposals
examined here are more generous than when they were
introduced.
All four proposals would offer the drug benefit as a vol-
untary program (called Part D of Medicare), but they
would allow beneficiaries only a one-time opportunity to
enroll without penalty. (If beneficiaries delayed enroll-
ment, they would pay a penalty related to their expected
benefit costs when they did sign up.) Without that provi-
sion, CBO would assume much lower rates of participa-
tion and much higher costs per enrollee for each proposal,
because people would tend to postpone enrollment until
their drug spending became relatively high.
In general, CBO assumes that all enrollees in Part B of
Medicare would participate in a drug benefit that subsi-
dized at least 50 percent of their premiums, so long as the
proposed drug program met the following criteria:5
 It offered a one-time option to enroll, coupled with an
actuarially set penalty for late enrollment;
 Beneficiaries were enrolled in the drug benefit by de-
fault;
 Premium payments were withheld from an enrollee’s
Social Security check in the same manner that Part B
premiums are withheld now;6 and,
 There were significant subsidies for low-income en-
rollees.
That approach includes a few exceptions, however. For
example, CBO assumes that the 3 percent of Part B en-
5. CBO also assumes that Medicare beneficiaries who choose not to
participate in Part B—where 75 percent of premiums are paid by
the government—would refuse to enroll in any drug benefit with a
lower subsidy rate.  
6. CBO uses a higher subsidy “hurdle” when private plans rather
than the Social Security Administration would administer the en-
rollment and premium-payment processes. In that case, a 75 per-
cent federal subsidy would be necessary to achieve 100 percent
participation.
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Provisions of Four Prescription Drug Proposals for Medicare
Clinton
Mid-Session 
Review Plan
Robb
Amendment H.R. 4680
Breaux-
Frist II
Benefit Amounts (Dollars)a
Deductible None 250 250 250
Benefit cap 1,000 None 1,050 1,050
Stop-loss amount 4,000 4,000 6,000 6,000
Benefit Administrator SSA SSA Plans SSA
Subsidies for Employment-Based
Health Plans Yes Yes Nob Nob
Number of Plans in Each Region One At least two At least two At least two
Plans Bear Insurance Risk No No Yes Yes
Federal Subsidy for All Enrolleesc 50% subsidy of
premium costs
below stop-loss
amount; 100% above
50% subsidy of 
premium costs
No subsidy of
premium costs;
graduated 
reinsurance rate, 
averaging 35%d
25% subsidy of
premium costs
below stop-loss
amount; 80%
reinsurance above
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Note: SSA = Social Security Administration.
a. The amounts that would apply in the Medicare drug benefit’s first year of operation, which is assumed to be calendar year 2005.
b. Employment-based health plans for retirees could participate as entities that provide a Medicare drug plan, with the same federal subsidy as other plans.
However, no attempt was made to estimate what share of total enrollment in the drug benefit they would account for.
c. “Premium costs” refers to the total value of the benefits paid out plus the cost of administering the drug program.
d. Today, the enrollee spending levels specified in H.R. 4680 at which federal reinsurance would be paid would lead to a federal subsidy of more than 35 percent.
However, the legislative language caps that subsidy at 35 percent.  Thus, the spending levels at which the federal government paid reinsurance would need to be
raised.
rollees who are active workers and have drug coverage
through their employer would keep that primary coverage
rather than sign up for the Medicare benefit.7 In addition,
CBO assumes that Part B enrollees who also qualify for
the Federal Employees Health Benefits (FEHB) program
or the military’s Tricare for Life (TFL) program would be
less likely to participate in a new Medicare drug benefit
because they already have fairly generous drug coverage.
Unless FEHB and TFL beneficiaries were forced to enroll
in a Medicare drug plan (which current law would not
permit), some might find that the premium for Part D
was not worth the additional benefits.
The Clinton Administration’s Proposal  
The proposal included in the Clinton Administration’s
2000 Mid-Session Review called for a Medicare drug bene-
fit that would have no deductible and would pay 50 per-
cent of an enrollee’s drug spending up to a limit of
$1,000 in 2005 (see Table 5). Once a participant incurred
$4,000 in out-of-pocket costs during the year, Medicare
would cover 100 percent of further drug spending. Under
the proposal, plans would have the flexibility to vary their
enrollees’ coinsurance rates if they could demonstrate that
7. That assumption is a simplifying one.  Some of the 3 percent
might enroll in a Medicare drug benefit, but under Medicare’s
secondary-payer rules, their employer’s plan would pay first and
thus would offset some of Medicare’s costs.
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the lower cost sharing would not raise costs for the Medi-
care program; that is, more-generous benefits would be
offset by more-effective cost management.
The Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS)
would set a uniform national premium for the drug bene-
fit. Under the Clinton proposal, enrollees’ premiums
would cover just half of a plan’s benefit spending below
the catastrophic cap and none of the spending above it.
As a result, CBO estimates that if the drug program be-
gan operating in 2005, the federal government would
subsidize 76 percent of benefit spending and administra-
tive expenses for enrollees. Their share of premiums
would amount to $30 a month in 2005, rising to $71 per
month by 2012 (see Table 6).
Enrollees with income of up to 150 percent of the federal
poverty level would receive assistance in paying their
premiums; those with income of up to 135 percent of the
poverty level would also get help in paying their cost-
sharing amounts, including any spending above the bene-
fit cap and below the stop-loss amount (the “hole”). In
addition, Medicare would offer a subsidy to employment-
based health plans to encourage them to remain the pri-
mary payer for their retirees’ drug coverage. That subsidy
would equal 67 percent of the premium subsidy that
Medicare would have paid if a plan’s retirees had enrolled
in the Part D benefit.
CBO assumed that 86 percent of Part B enrollees would
participate in the drug benefit, and another 7 percent
would receive drug coverage indirectly through federal
subsidies to employment-based plans. The remaining
7 percent of Medicare beneficiaries would not take part in
the drug program but would continue to have drug cover-
age through their current employer, FEHB, or TFL.
Under the Clinton Administration’s proposal, PBMs or
other entities would compete to be the sole Medicare
drug plan in each geographic area for a specified period of
time. PBMs would not bear insurance risk for the drug
spending of their enrollees, and they would face some re-
strictions in the cost containment approaches they could
use. For example, they would have to set dispensing fees
high enough to ensure participation by most retail phar-
macies. In addition, enrollees would be guaranteed access
to any drug that the prescribing physician certified as
medically necessary. For those reasons, and because  only
one PBM would be chosen to serve each region, CBO
assigned the proposal a relatively weak cost-management
factor (10 percent).
CBO estimates that the Clinton Administration’s plan
would pay about 29 percent of the total drug costs of all
Medicare beneficiaries—sufficiently generous to raise
drug prices by about 8.5 percent above the level they
would otherwise reach at the end of 10 years. In 2005,
about 8 percent of Medicare’s costs for the benefit would
result from the greater use of drugs induced by the new
coverage.
The Robb Amendment
Among the proposals examined here, the Robb amend-
ment is the only one that would not cap an enrollee’s
benefits. Under that proposal, enrollees would pay a $250
deductible and graduated coinsurance rates—50 percent
until their annual out-of-pocket spending for prescription
drugs reached $3,500, then 25 percent until their out-of-
pocket spending reached $4,000. After that amount,
Medicare would cover 100 percent of any additional drug
spending. The entities selected to administer the benefit
would be allowed to waive the deductible for generic
drugs and to lower enrollees’ coinsurance rates if they
could show that the lower cost sharing would be offset by
effective cost management. The Robb plan also includes
low-income subsidies to cover premiums and cost sharing
for enrollees with income of up to 135 percent of the
poverty level and premium assistance for people with
income of up to 150 percent of the poverty level.
Like the Clinton Administration’s plan, the Robb amend-
ment would have the Secretary of HHS set a uniform
nationwide premium. Federal subsidies would cover half
of the cost of benefits and administrative expenses, with
enrollees paying the other half through premiums. Their
share of premiums would be about $67 per month in
2005, growing to $137 per month by 2012.
The Robb proposal would also offer to subsidize employ-
ment-based health plans if they remained the primary
form of coverage for their retirees. Under that approach,
Medicare would pay the plans 67 percent of the amount
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CBO’s Assumptions for Four Prescription Drug Proposals
Clinton
Mid-Session
Review Plan
Robb
Amend-
ment
H.R.
4680
Breaux-
Frist II
Values for Calendar Years 2005 Through 2012
Percentage of Medicare Part B Enrollees Who Would Participate in the Drug Benefit
Direct participation 86 85 75 87
Indirect participation (Through employer subsidy) 7 7 a a
Percentage of Medicare Part B Enrollees Who Would Not Participate in the Drug Benefit
People with other drug coverageb 7 7 7 5
People without other drug coverage    0    0   18    8
Total (All Medicare Part B Enrollees) 100 100 100 100
Cost-Management Factorc (Percent) 10 17.5 30 30
Federal Subsidy of Benefit Costs and Administrative Expenses for Enrollees in
the Medicare Drug Program (Percent) 76 50 32 43
Share of Total Drug Spending by or for Medicare Beneficiaries Paid by the
Federal Government (Percent) 29 21 12 15
Values for Calendar Year 2005
Enrollees’ Share of Monthly Premium (Dollars) 30 67 72 56
Plans’ Marketing and Enrollment Costs (As a percentage of benefit spending) 0 7.8 13.5 11.9
Risk Premiumd (As a percentage of benefit spending) 0 0 4.6 5.0
Percentage Increase in Drug Prices Expected Because of New Benefite 0.9 1.5 * 0.1
Percentage of Benefit Costs Resulting from Increased Demand for Drugs Under New Benefitf 7.6 8.9 4.4 5.1
Values for Calendar Year 2012
Enrollees’ Share of Monthly Premium (Dollars) 71 137 119 95
Plans’ Marketing and Enrollment Costs (As a percentage of benefit spending) 0 2.4 4.6 4.1
Risk Premiumd (As a percentage of benefit spending) 0 0 3.3 3.6
Percentage Increase in Drug Prices Expected Because of New Benefite 6.8 11.8 0.2 0.5
Percentage of Benefit Costs Resulting from Increased Demand for Drugs Under New Benefitf 9.6 8.7 3.9 4.7
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Note: * = less than 0.05 percent.
a. Employment-based health plans for retirees could participate as entities that provide a Medicare drug plan, with the same federal subsidy as other plans.
However, no attempt was made to estimate what share of total enrollment in the drug benefit they would account for.
b. Active workers with employment-based coverage or people covered by the Federal Employees Health Benefits program or the Tricare for Life program.
c. The percentage by which drug spending would fall relative to unmanaged purchases. For Breaux-Frist II and H.R. 4680, at-risk plans would have a cost-man-
agement factor of 30 percent, and fallback plans (5 percent or less of the total) would have a cost-management factor of 12.5 percent, for an average of about 29
percent. For people with supplemental drug coverage, the ultimate effect is a blend of Medicare’s cost management and that of the supplemental plan.
d. The percentage of total benefit costs required to compensate plans for assuming insurance risk.  CBO assumes that competing at-risk plans would require a risk
premium equal to 7 percent of the benefits at risk in the first year of the program, declining to a steady state of 5 percent.  Because of reinsurance provisions, 72
percent of benefits would be at risk under Breaux-Frist II, and 65 percent of benefits would be at risk under H.R. 4680.
e. The price effect is usually reported as the expected increase in prices at the end of a 10-year period. The 10th-year values for these proposals are 8.5 percent for
the Clinton plan, 14.7 percent for the Robb amendment, 0.2 percent for H.R. 4680, and 0.6 percent for Breaux-Frist II.
f. For prescription drug spending, CBO assumes an elasticity of demand of -0.3, which means that enrollees’ use of drugs is expected to increase by 3 percent for
each 10 percent drop in out-of-pocket costs.
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it would have paid in subsidies if the plans’ retirees had
enrolled in the new Part D drug benefit. 
CBO assumed that 85 percent of Medicare Part B en-
rollees would participate in this proposal’s drug benefit,
and another 7 percent would receive coverage through the
subsidy to employment-based plans for retirees. As under
the Clinton proposal, the other 7 percent of Medicare
beneficiaries would not participate in the drug benefit but
would retain other coverage.
The Robb amendment envisions a competitive system,
with at least two entities (selected through competitive
bidding) administering the drug benefit in each region.
Medicare would compensate PBMs by paying them an
administrative fee. Those payments could be increased or
decreased on the basis of whether the PBMs met certain
performance standards, such as quality of service, en-
rollees’ satisfaction, or targets for average spending per
enrollee. PBMs could use restrictive formularies, subject
to rules set by a national committee. However, all drugs
approved for marketing in the United States would have
to be provided if medically necessary, as established
through procedures set by the PBM.
Under the proposal, at least two PBMs would compete
for enrollees in each region, but they would not be subject
to insurance risk for their enrollees’ drug spending. Those
plans would also have fewer explicit restrictions on the
tools they could employ to control drug spending than
under the Clinton Administration’s plan. Consequently,
CBO assigned the proposal a much higher cost manage-
ment factor (17.5 percent) than the one for the Clinton
plan.
Because of the structure of the proposed benefit, CBO
assigned the Robb amendment the highest price effect of
the four proposals—an increase of nearly 15 percent in
drug prices by the end of 10 years. The Robb proposal
would pay for about 21 percent of total drug spending by
or for Medicare beneficiaries, CBO estimates. In 2005,
about 9 percent of Medicare’s costs for the benefit would
come from enrollees’ increased use of prescription drugs.
H.R. 4680
This proposal, which the House of Representatives passed
in October 2000 but the Senate did not consider, also
envisioned a drug benefit with a $250 deductible. Medi-
care would pay 50 percent of participants’ drug costs, up
to a cap of $1,050 in the first year of the benefit. Once
enrollees incurred out-of-pocket costs of $6,000 or more
during the year, Medicare would cover 100 percent of
their drug spending. H.R. 4680 would allow participat-
ing plans to offer actuarially equivalent versions of the
standard benefit—subject to certain limitations. 
Low-income subsidies would cover premiums and cost-
sharing expenses for enrollees with income of up to 135
percent of the poverty level, except that they would be
responsible for covering any spending above the benefit
cap and below the stop-loss amount. Enrollees with in-
come of up to 150 percent of the poverty level would be
eligible for assistance with their Part D premiums.
Once approved by the administering agency through a
process of negotiation, plans would compete for enrollees
in a region on the basis of premiums, access to drugs, and
quality of service. Unlike the two proposals discussed
above, H.R. 4680 would require those plans to assume
significant insurance risk. It would also allow them to use
a broad array of tools to control their enrollees’ drug
spending.
The federal government would ensure that at least two
plans were available in each area, one of which could be a
Medicare+Choice plan offering drug coverage. Employ-
ment-based health plans for retirees would also be eligible
to participate directly as entities themselves. In any area
not served by at least two plans, Medicare would have
authority to offer financial incentives (such as a partial
underwriting of risk) to encourage plans to operate in that
region.
Rather than having one nationwide premium set by
Medicare, H.R. 4680 would allow entities to set their
own premiums. As a result, premiums would vary geo-
graphically and among plans. On average, enrollees would
pay about $72 per month in premiums in 2005 and $119
per month by 2012.
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Unlike in the other proposals, the federal government
would not provide an across-the-board subsidy of each
plan’s premium. Instead, it would make reinsurance pay-
ments to plans for the spending of very high cost enrol-
lees; in total, those payments would amount to 35 percent
of the total cost of benefits paid out under the Part D
program. Since plans would also incur costs for bearing
risk and marketing to enrollees, CBO estimates that the
federal government would pay for about 32 percent of
plans’ total spending.
Given that the proposal would offer a federal subsidy of
less than 50 percent and that private entities would run
the enrollment process and collect premium payments,
CBO estimated that only about 75 percent of Part B en-
rollees would participate in the drug benefit under H.R.
4680. Another 7 percent of Part B enrollees would obtain
drug coverage through their employer (because they are
still active workers) or through FEHB or TFL. The re-
maining 18 percent of Medicare beneficiaries would not
have drug coverage.
Compared with the other proposals, H.R. 4680 was as-
signed a relatively high cost-management factor (30 per-
cent). The proposal would give plans greater incentive to
control costs because they would be at risk for their en-
rollees’ drug spending. They would also have relatively
greater authority because they would face fewer restric-
tions on their cost-management tools. However, CBO
estimates that a small share of enrollees (5 percent or less)
would be served by fallback plans, which would bear
much less risk and thus would not manage costs as
tightly.
The benefit under H.R. 4680 would pay approximately
12 percent of Medicare beneficiaries’ total drug costs.
The relatively small benefit would cause very little in-
crease in drug prices—0.2 percent by the end of 10 years,
CBO estimates. Induced demand, which would result
because certain enrollees gained better insurance coverage,
would account for slightly more than 4 percent of Medi-
care’s costs in 2005.
Breaux-Frist II
This proposal has the exact same benefit structure as H.R.
4680 and a similar subsidy for low-income enrollees, but
the federal subsidy for all enrollees differs. Whereas the
House-passed bill would provide all of its federal subsidy
through individual reinsurance payments for high-cost
enrollees, Breaux-Frist II would subsidize 25 percent of
premium costs below the $6,000 catastrophic cap and
subsidize 80 percent of stop-loss benefits through individ-
ual reinsurance. CBO estimates that the combination of
those two types of subsidies would total about 43 percent
of premium costs.
Multiple risk-bearing plans would offer the benefit in
each region, and premiums could vary geographically and
among plans. (Enrollees’ share of premiums would aver-
age $56 per month in 2005 and $95 per month in 2012,
CBO estimates.)  However, unlike in H.R. 4680, the
Social Security Administration would administer enroll-
ment and collect premiums. Because of the higher federal
subsidy and the near-automatic nature of SSA adminis-
tration, CBO assumed higher participation: 87 percent of
Part B enrollees. Another 5 percent would obtain drug
coverage through their current employer, FEHB, or TFL,
leaving 8 percent of Medicare beneficiaries without drug
coverage.
PBMs would have the same incentives and authority to
contain costs under this proposal that they would have
under H.R. 4680, so CBO assigned the same cost-man-
agement factor (30 percent). Plans’ marketing and enroll-
ment costs would be somewhat lower under Breaux-Frist
II than under H.R. 4680, because SSA would bear the
cost of enrolling people and collecting their share of pre-
miums. However, a plan’s insurance-risk premium would
cost more under this proposal because a higher share of
total benefit costs would be at risk: 72 percent rather than
65 percent.
Although the two proposals envision identical benefit
structures, Breaux-Frist II would have a slightly larger
effect than H.R. 4680 would on drug prices (an increase
of 0.6 percent by the end of a 10-year period) because of
higher enrollment. In all, that proposal would pay for
about 15 percent of total drug spending by or for
Medicare beneficiaries. Induced demand for prescription
drugs would account for about 5 percent of Medicare’s
costs in 2005.
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Cost Estimates for the Four Proposals
Of the four proposals described above, the Clinton Ad-
ministration’s would be the most expensive, CBO esti-
mates. It would cost the federal government a total of
$512 billion between 2005 and 2012 (the last year of the
current budget window), followed by the Robb amend-
ment at $374 billion (see Table 7). The two proposals that
have the same benefit structure but different federal subsi-
dies, Breaux-Frist II and H.R. 4680, would be less costly
to the federal government—$233 billion and $195 bil-
lion, respectively, over eight years. Those totals reflect
additional costs for Medicare partly offset by savings for
other federal programs.
The federal costs of a particular drug benefit depend
largely on the extensiveness of the coverage and on what
share of that coverage the government would pay for.
Thus, the Robb and Clinton plans—which would pay for
20 percent to 30 percent of total drug spending by or for
Medicare beneficiaries—would have the highest costs to
Medicare. H.R. 4680 and Breaux-Frist II—which would
pay 12 percent to 15 percent of Medicare beneficiaries’
total drug costs—would have lower costs to the Medicare
program.
A new Medicare drug benefit would affect not only Medi-
care’s costs but also those of other federal programs—
especially Medicaid, Tricare for Life, and the Federal
Employees Health Benefits program. Any expansion of
Medicare benefits would reduce those programs’ health
care costs for beneficiaries who were also eligible for
Medicare. In the case of Medicaid, the federal govern-
ment would have to pay less in matching contributions to
state Medicaid programs for their spending on prescrip-
tion drugs.
The savings to other federal programs from a Medicare
drug benefit would be similar under the Clinton and
Robb proposals—$145 billion and $142 billion, respec-
tively, over the 2005-2012 period—because the two plans
are nearly the same in terms of the scope of their drug
coverage. Savings would be significantly smaller under
H.R. 4680 and Breaux-Frist II—$84 billion and $78 bil-
lion, respectively—because those proposals would cover
less of their enrollees’ drug spending.
Each of the four proposals includes provisions that would
subsidize all or part of the premium and cost-sharing
expenses for low-income enrollees. As Table 7 shows, the
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Federal Costs of Four Prescription Drug Proposals, 2005-2012
(By fiscal year, in billions of dollars)
Clinton
Mid-Session
Review Plan
Robb
Amendment H.R. 4680
Breaux-
Frist II
Federal Mandatory Spending on Prescription
Drug Benefits for Medicare Beneficiaries
Medicare 507 342 120 178
Other federal programsa -145 -142 -84 -78
Low-income subsidy 128 148 141 123
Other Mandatory Spending   22   27   18   10
Total 512 374 195 233
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Note: These numbers exclude a small amount of appropriated funds for federal administrative costs.
a. Principally Medicaid, the Federal Employees Health Benefits program, and the military’s Tricare for Life program. Negative numbers indicate savings.
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costs of those low-income subsidies can be quite large: in
the case of H.R. 4680, surpassing even the costs to the
Medicare program itself. The costs of the low-income
subsidy are fairly similar among the four proposals—
ranging from $123 billion to $148 billion over eight
years. The reason for that similarity is that the differences
in coverage among those Medicare drug benefits, which
affect the subsidies for cost sharing, tend to be offset by
differences in enrollees’ premiums.8 In other words, if a
Medicare benefit covered less drug spending, the low-
income subsidy would be responsible for picking up more
enrollee cost sharing. However, premiums for such a
benefit would also tend to be lower, offsetting some of
the cost-sharing expense.
In addition to the costs described above, a Medicare drug
benefit would have other effects on federal spending. One
is the additional cost that Medicaid and Medicare would
incur if, as CBO expects, the low-income subsidies avail-
able under the drug benefit led more Medicare beneficia-
ries to apply for Medicaid benefits. Those new dual eligi-
bles would increase costs for Medicaid, which would have
to cover their cost-sharing expenses under Medicare. That
increase would also raise Medicare’s costs for those bene-
ficiaries, because their use of covered services would rise.
Another effect comes from provisions in certain proposals
under which the federal government would keep some of
the windfall savings that states would enjoy when a new
Medicare drug benefit displaced state Medicaid drug
spending. Such provisions tend to lower federal costs. A
third effect is that of higher prices for prescription drugs
in other federal programs (such as FEHB and TFL) that
provide coverage to some Medicare enrollees. The line
labeled “Other Mandatory Spending” in Table 7 shows
the net impact of those effects.
8. CBO’s estimate for the Clinton proposal assumes that the low-
income subsidy would pay all drug costs in the hole between the
benefit cap and the catastrophic stop-loss limit. The Robb pro-
posal has no such hole because it has no benefit cap. For H.R.
4680 and Breaux-Frist II, the low-income subsidies would not
cover the hole.
APPENDIX
$
Formulary-Based Strategies for Cost Control
Used in the Private Sector
$ key management tool that private-sector health
plans and their pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) use to
control costs is drug formularies. A formulary is a list of
drugs that a health plan will cover.1 Formularies are
generally created by pharmacy and therapeutics (P&T)
committees that health plans (or employers that sponsor
plans) establish to evaluate new drugs and to compare the
clinical and economic characteristics of different drugs
prescribed for the same medical condition. When a P&T
committee judges two or more products to be therapeu-
tically equivalent, it may recommend that only one of the
products be included in the formulary. The health plan
might pay part of its patients’ costs for formulary drugs
but would expect patients to pay the full price for any
nonformulary drug—thus giving its enrollees a big
incentive to choose formulary drugs. (Most plans that use
a formulary have a process whereby enrollees can request
exceptions to the formulary.) 
Formularies can save money for health plans in two ways.
First, to the extent that a formulary includes lower-priced
drugs, any shift in prescribing patterns from nonformu-
lary to formulary drugs will save money. Second, manu-
facturers may give price concessions—usually in the form
of rebates—to a plan as an inducement to have their
products included in the formulary.
Drug-Preference Systems
In recent years, health plans have moved away from the
traditional all-or-nothing formulary to a less rigid set of
rules based on degrees of preference. In those preference
systems, the health plan pays some share of the cost for all
prescription drugs approved by the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (except any drugs specifically excluded, such
as certain “lifestyle” drugs), but that share is larger for
“preferred” drugs than for others. Preference systems still
give enrollees an incentive to use preferred drugs, but the
difference in out-of-pocket cost is not as great as with all-
or-nothing formularies. Also, preference systems generally
do not include a process for exceptions.
The way in which a plan computes its share of a drug’s
cost under a preference system is critical in determining
how much the drug benefit will ultimately cost both the
plan and its enrollees. Preference systems feature three
basic reimbursement structures:
 Tiered copayments, in which enrollees pay a fixed dollar
copayment to a network pharmacy for drugs on the
preferred list and a higher fixed copayment for other
drugs (such as $10 per prescription for a preferred
drug and $25 for a nonpreferred drug). For its part,
the plan agrees to pay the pharmacy the difference
between the full cost of the drug and that copayment.
The full cost of the drug is usually negotiated with
dispensing pharmacies in the PBM’s network. Typi-
cally, that cost is based on an estimate of the phar-
macy’s cost of acquiring the drug’s ingredients, plus a
negotiated fee for dispensing the prescription.
1. Most hospitals also use formularies to determine what drugs they
will stock or dispense. A formulary usually takes one of two forms:
listing only those drugs that are covered (a closed formulary), or the
mirror image, listing only those drugs that are not covered (an open
formulary). This appendix focuses on closed formularies. 
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 Graduated coinsurance rates, in which the plan pays the
pharmacy a higher percentage of the full prescription
cost for a preferred drug than for a nonpreferred drug
(for example, 80 percent for a preferred drug and
50 percent for a nonpreferred drug). Enrollees pay the
rest.
 Reference pricing, in which the plan pays the pharmacy
a specified share of the full cost for a preferred drug
and a dollar amount for a nonpreferred drug that
equals what it would pay for a  “reference” drug (a pre-
ferred drug that the P&T committee deems to be
therapeutically equivalent to the nonpreferred drug).
The enrollee pays the pharmacy the difference between
the cost of the nonpreferred drug and the plan’s share
of the cost of the reference drug.
Tiered copayments are the arrangement used most fre-
quently in private-sector drug plans today. In that system,
the enrollee’s financial exposure is capped at the highest
copayment, and the enrollee’s financial incentive to
switch to a preferred drug is limited by the difference
between the fixed copayments. The tiered-copayment sys-
tem protects consumers against uncertainty about price
differences between drugs when they enroll in a health
plan and also against high out-of-pocket costs for very
expensive drugs. However, it also partially shields con-
sumers (or their physicians) from considering the trade-
offs between medical benefits and price when wide differ-
ences exist between the actual prices of preferred and
nonpreferred drugs.
Graduated coinsurance rates expose consumers to differ-
ences in drug prices more than tiered copayments do and
thus make them more sensitive to price differences in
their prescription choices. However, consumers are still
insulated from the full price differences between preferred
and nonpreferred drugs. Because enrollees’ out-of-pocket
costs vary with the price of a drug as well as with its status
on the preferred list, enrollees can be uncertain about the
extra cost associated with buying a nonpreferred drug.
Reference pricing exposes enrollees to the full price differ-
ences between preferred and nonpreferred drugs while
still providing some reimbursement to enrollees who buy
nonpreferred drugs. The greater the price difference be-
tween the preferred drug and its nonpreferred alternative,
the more attractive the preferred drug appears. If the
plan’s contribution to the cost of the preferred drug is
high, consumers will face little cost in obtaining that
drug, even if it is very expensive. However, when they en-
roll in a plan, patients face uncertainty about how much
they will have to pay for a nonpreferred drug, because
that amount depends on the difference between its price
and the price of the preferred drug. Plans, by contrast,
have more certainty about their own spending than they
do with either tiered copayments or graduated coinsur-
ance rates, because their payment does not depend on the
consumer’s choice between preferred and nonpreferred
drugs.
Effectiveness of Cost Control
for Different Kinds of Drugs
A critical question is how effective each of those drug-
preference systems would be in containing overall drug
spending compared with an all-or-nothing formulary or
with no formulary at all. Each system has certain advan-
tages, which depend on the number and kinds of compet-
ing drugs in a therapeutic class.
Some drugs have little or no competition—not only be-
cause they are protected from generic copy by patents or
other exclusive marketing rights but also because no simi-
lar drugs are available on the market. The first drug to
treat a condition that hitherto had no available therapy
would essentially be a one-of-a-kind member of a thera-
peutic class. As long as no close competitors were devel-
oped, neither formularies nor preference systems would
have much effect on the price or use of that drug.2
Some therapeutic classes comprise several drugs, at least
one of which has lost patent protection and is available in
generic form. (Selective seratonin reuptake inhibitors,
2. Plans might resort to excluding certain new drugs from coverage.
The threat of such exclusion could have much the same effect as
formularies would on those drugs’ initial prices. However, it would
be politically difficult—as well as deleterious to patients’ health—
for the administrators of a Medicare drug benefit to exclude highly
effective one-of-a-kind therapies on the basis of price alone.
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which treat depression, are an example. Of the five dis-
tinct drug molecules in that class, two are available as
generic copies.)  When generic versions of at least one
drug in a therapeutic class are available, reference pricing
offers health plans the greatest opportunity to achieve cost
savings in that class. Makers of generic drugs compete
vigorously on the basis of the price at which they sell to
pharmacies. If PBMs have good information about those
prices, they can agree to pay network pharmacies a refer-
ence price at or near that level (adding an appropriate
prescription-dispensing fee for the pharmacist). When
enrollees choose to buy a brand-name version of a drug
(or a competing drug that is not available in generic
form), they must pay the full difference in price. 
Some therapeutic classes contain only a few distinct drug
molecules, all of which are protected by patents. (The
new class of Cox-2 inhibitors, for example, contains only
two drugs at present, Vioxx® and Celebrex®, although
several other molecules have been submitted to the Food
and Drug Administration for approval.)  For small thera-
peutic classes such as those, reference pricing might not
be as effective as tiered copayments in reducing costs. A
tiered-copayment system lets a PBM require manufactur-
ers of therapeutically equivalent drugs to bid for preferred
status by offering rebates to the PBM. If the bidding is
confidential, manufacturers will not know what their
competitors may bid, so they will feel pressure to offer
high rebates, and the PBM need not reveal the effective
price offered by competing manufacturers.3 With a
reference-pricing system, by contrast, manufacturers of
competing drugs would know (or soon learn) their com-
petitors’ prices. For therapeutic classes with only a few
competitors, tacit price collusion could result, with all
firms maintaining prices that were higher than they
would have been under a tiered-copayment system.4
In the end, the amount that plans can save through differ-
ent methods of enforcing formularies will depend on the
copayments or coinsurance rates chosen for each tier, the
number of tiers selected, and most important, the narrow-
ness with which therapeutic classes are defined. If a P&T
committee considers a broad array of drugs—of widely
different ages and different mechanisms of action against
the same disease—to be therapeutically equivalent, the
opportunities for savings will be greater with reference
pricing.
For example, if Cox-2 inhibitors were classified as part of
the nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory class (which contains
many old drugs with inexpensive generic versions avail-
able), a reference-pricing system in which a generic drug
was preferred would cause the health plan to pay little for
the Cox-2 drugs and consumers to bear a high share of
the cost. Fewer enrollees would opt for Cox-2 inhibitors
over the older, cheaper drugs. Conversely, if Cox-2 inhib-
itors were considered a distinct therapeutic class, the po-
tential for savings would be lessened.
The trade-off for greater savings is that wide therapeutic
classes containing drugs that have lost patent protection
are more likely than narrow classes to reduce incentives
for companies to invest in researching and developing
new drugs.5 If manufacturers believe that new drugs that
make modest or even major clinical improvements will be
classified in existing therapeutic classes, they will be dis-
couraged from investing in such drugs by the prospect of
lower returns. But at the other extreme, if classes are so
narrowly defined that new drugs with small or even negli-
gible improvements in effectiveness or safety are placed in
their own separate class, drug companies will be encour-
aged to invest in new drugs that may not be cost-effective.
The effect of wide therapeutic classes on research and de-
velopment would be greater under reference pricing than
under tiered copayments. The reason is that a tiered-
copayment system caps a patient’s out-of-pocket pay-
ment, even for drugs that are not preferred, whereas refer-
3. That would probably not hold true with a Medicare drug benefit if
Medicare required PBMs to pass on rebates to enrollees and the
government at the point of each sale. Under such a rule, manufac-
turers would be able to learn what effective price the winning bid-
der had offered, so confidential bidding would be less successful in
forcing price competition.
4. See F.M. Scherer, “How U.S. Antitrust Can Go Astray: The Brand
Name Prescription Drug Litigation,” International Journal of the
Economics of Business, vol. 4, no. 3 (1997), pp. 239-256. 
5. Patricia M. Danzon, “Pharmaceutical Benefit Management: An
Alternative Approach,” Health Affairs, vol. 19, no. 2 (March/April
2000), pp. 24-25.
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ence pricing would place no upper limit on the patient’s
out-of-pocket cost. Thus, new drugs with high launch
prices would have a greater disadvantage under a refer-
ence-pricing system with wide therapeutic classes than
they would under a tiered-copayment system with the
same therapeutic classifications.
APPENDIX
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Evidence About How Drug Coverage
Affects the Use of Other Health Care Services
$ new Medicare drug benefit could lead to
changes in the use—and, hence, the costs—of other
health care services. People who argue that additional
spending on prescription drugs would be at least partly
offset by savings on other sources of health care (such as
hospitals, physicians, and nursing homes) point to in-
direct evidence from three types of research:
 Studies of how specific drugs or classes of drugs affect
the use of other health care,
 Studies of how improving access to prescription drugs
(through insurance coverage) for vulnerable subgroups
of the population changes their use of other health
care services, and
 Studies of how the use of more or newer prescription
drugs by defined populations affects their use of other
health care services.
None of those approaches exactly address the question of
how Medicare coverage for drugs might alter the use of
other Medicare services.  Moreover, the findings of those
studies are conflicting and, in some cases, difficult to
interpret. 
Studies of Specific Drugs or Classes
Published studies of the impact of specific drugs or drug
classes on the use of health care are, by definition, selec-
tive. Many of those studies have concluded that a partic-
ular drug or class of drugs would reduce, or has reduced,
the use of expensive health care services.1
In general, such studies suffer from two methodological
problems. First, they may be subject to publication bias—
the tendency of authors to submit, and journals to pub-
lish, studies with findings that suggest improvements
from therapy.2 Second, many of those studies focus on
groups of patients for whom the drug or drug class is
approved for marketing (people who generally show the
greatest positive effect from the drug) and exclude patient
groups for whom the drug might be ineffective or even
1. See, for example, Samuel A. Bozzette and others, “Expenditures for
the Care of HIV-Infected Patients in the Era of Highly Active
Antiretroviral Therapy,” New England Journal of Medicine, vol.
344, no. 11 (2001), pp. 817-823; and the Study of Left Ventricu-
lar Dysfunction (SOLVD) investigators, “Effect of Enalapril on
Survival in Patients with Reduced Left Ventricular Ejection Frac-
tions and Congestive Heart Failure,” New England Journal of Medi-
cine, vol. 325, no. 5 (1991), pp. 293-302.
2. See Mark Friedberg and others, “Evaluation of Conflict of Interest
in Economic Analysis of New Drugs Used in Oncology,” Journal of
the American Medical Association, vol. 282, no. 15 (October 1999),
pp. 1453-1457; and Carin Olson and others, “Publication Bias and
Editorial Decisionmaking,” Journal of the American Medical Associa-
tion, vol. 287, no. 21 (June 5, 2002), pp. 2825-2828.
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harmful.3 Consequently, those studies provide little in-
sight into the overall effect of changes in prescription
drug coverage.
Studies of Changes in Access to Drugs
Only a handful of studies address the impact on health
care use of a policy that alters access to prescription drugs.
A major drawback of those studies is that they focus on
the effects of reducing access to prescription drugs among
subgroups of the population who have already been diag-
nosed with a chronic illness. A study that looked at the
effects of increasing access to a wide variety of prescrip-
tion drugs among a population that was more representa-
tive of all elderly people would be more useful in this
case.
In 1981, New Hampshire changed its Medicaid rules by
limiting to three the number of prescriptions that Medic-
aid patients could have filled in any month. A well-con-
trolled study of that change found that the use of pre-
scription drugs by elderly patients who were on regular
medication for chronic illnesses declined as a result.4 Their
nursing home admissions increased, but their hospitaliza-
tion rates did not. Because people in nursing homes were
exempt from the three-prescription limit, the increase in
nursing home admissions among chronically ill patients
may have been an attempt to obtain needed drugs. The
study did not examine all elderly patients who were sub-
ject to the limit; healthier individuals might have had
fewer emergency and inpatient admissions because of
reduced likelihood of harmful drug interactions, side ef-
fects, or other adverse drug events.
A more recent study of changes in a drug insurance pro-
gram for the elderly  focused on the Canadian province of
Quebec, which restricted financial access to drugs by
raising cost-sharing rates in 1996 and increasing deduct-
ibles in 1997.5 That study found that use of prescription
drugs declined in patients who, when the first policy
change occurred, had been taking drugs deemed by a
panel of clinicians to be “essential.” Those patients also
had an increased number of emergency room visits and
admissions to hospitals or nursing homes. Patients taking
drugs deemed “less essential” also saw their use of pre-
scription drugs decline, but their use of other health care
services did not increase. (Indeed, they showed a modest,
but statistically insignificant, trend toward reduced hospi-
talization.) However, those two sets of drugs represented
only about half of all prescriptions filled by the elderly;
the effect of the restrictive financial policies on people
taking other drugs was not studied. Thus, it is impossible
from the study’s results to assess the net effects of those
restrictions on the use of other health care services among
affected individuals.
Two studies of how state pharmaceutical assistance pro-
grams for low-income seniors affected the use of other
health services found suggestive evidence that people
enrolled in the programs used hospitals and other sources
of health care less frequently than did other people stud-
ied.6 However, because of data limitations, the methods
used to control for competing factors that might account
for those effects were crude. Consequently, the studies do
not provide much insight into how a Medicare drug ben-
efit could alter the use of other health care services.
3. Thomas Bodenheimer, Conflict of Interest in Clinical Drug Trials: A
Risk Factor for Scientific Misconduct (Department of Health and
Human Services, Office for Human Research Protections, August
15, 2000), available at http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/coi/boden-
heimer.htm; and Laura F. Hutchins and others,  “Underrepresenta-
tion of Patients 65 Years of Age or Older in Cancer-Treatment
Trials,” New England Journal of Medicine, vol. 341, no. 27 (De-
cember 30, 1999), pp. 2061-2067.
4. Stephen B. Soumerai and others, “Effects of Medicaid Drug-Pay-
ment Limits on Admission to Hospitals and Nursing Homes,” New
England Journal of Medicine, vol. 325 (October 1991), pp. 1072-
1077.
5. Robyn Tamblyn and others, “Adverse Events Associated with Pre-
scription Drug Cost-Sharing Among Poor and Elderly Persons,”
Journal of the American Medical Association, vol. 285, no. 4 (Janu-
ary 24/31, 2001), pp. 421-429.
6. Earle W. Lingle, K. Kirk, and W. Kelly, “The Impact of Outpa-
tient Drug Benefits on the Use and Costs of Health Care Services
for the Elderly,” Inquiry, vol. 24 (Fall 1987), pp. 203-211; and
Center for Health Policy Studies, EPIC Evaluation Report to the
Governor and Legislature: An Evaluation of New York State’s Elderly
Pharmaceutical Insurance Coverage Program (Columbia, Md.:
CHPS Consulting, no date).
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Results were recently reported for a study that looked at
the difference between three-tiered copayments and two-
tiered copayments in the use of other medical services by
enrollees in employment-based drug plans.7 Moving from
a two-tired to a three-tiered copayment system raises the
cost of drugs not included on the preferred-drug list. The
researchers found that in the year after the three-tiered
system was introduced, drug use declined, but no signifi-
cant differences in use of physicians, hospitals, or emer-
gency medical services occurred.  However, most of the
enrollees were active workers and their dependents, who
can be expected to be healthier and less dependent on
prescription drugs than a Medicare population. Also,
preferred drugs were determined by a pharmacy and ther-
apeutics committee and presumably included only those
classes of drug for which adequate choices exist.
Studies of the Effects of More
and Newer Drugs
Two studies by Frank Lichtenberg provide suggestive
evidence that increased use of prescription drugs and sub-
stitution of newer for older drugs are associated with
lower use of hospitals and other health care services as
well as lower mortality.8 In particular, the second of those
studies makes perhaps the strongest case that greater use
of prescription drugs can lead to declines in nondrug
health services. Yet even with Lichtenberg’s relatively
careful approach, that study’s methodology may have
underestimated each patient’s nondrug health spending
and thereby overstated the effects of newer drugs.
The first study related disease-specific changes in rates of
hospital use between 1980 and 1991 to the change in the
volume of prescriptions associated with each disease and
to a disease-specific “drug novelty” index.9 Increases in
drug volume were correlated with reductions in hospital
admissions, length of stay, and number of surgeries over
the period. (The drug novelty index was also associated
with declines in those measures of hospital use.)
One major problem with that study is that it assumed
that unmeasured determinants of hospitalization rates—
such as changes in hospital payment over the period—
were not correlated with the degree of drug innovation
(novelty) or with changes in drug use for a given diagno-
sis. But there is reason to believe that such correlation
existed. Third-party payment and regulatory policies
changed dramatically during the study period and en-
couraged reductions in days of hospital care.10 Common
diagnoses (such as cardiovascular disease) were likely to
offer opportunities for big overall savings in hospital days
as well as big markets for new drugs. Because the novelty
index was based on switches among individual molecules,
diseases with bigger markets would also be expected to
have higher novelty indexes. Similarly, diseases with big-
ger markets might also provide greater financial incentives
for the development of new diagnostic technologies,
which would increase the number of people receiving
therapy, and at earlier stages of the diseases. Thus, the
study could be biased in favor of attributing too great a
share of the decline in hospital utilization to increases in
drug use and to the substitution of new drugs for old
drugs.
The second study took a different tack. Lichtenberg hy-
pothesized that people who took drugs that came on the
market more recently would use less health care in 1996
(the year for which a survey of health care use was avail-
7. Brenda Motheral and Kathleen Fairman, “Effect of a Three-Tiered
Prescription Copay on Pharmaceutical and Other Medical Utiliza-
tion,” Medical Care, vol. 39 (2001), pp. 1293-1304.
8. Frank R. Lichtenberg, “Do (More and Better) Drugs Keep People
Out of Hospitals?” Health Economics, vol. 86, no. 2 (May 1996),
pp. 384-388; and Frank R. Lichtenberg, The Benefits and Costs of
Newer Drugs:  Evidence from the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey, Working Paper No. 8147 (Cambridge, Mass.:  National
Bureau of Economic Research, 2001).
9. The drug novelty index was a measure of the change in the distri-
bution of specific drug molecules prescribed between 1980 and
1991. An index value of zero meant no change in distribution be-
tween those years.  A value of 1 meant no agreement at all in pre-
scribing patterns between 1980 and 1991.
10. Most notably, in 1984, Medicare began using prospective payment
for hospitals. It also required greater review of hospital admissions
over the period. By 1991, the number of days of hospital care per
1,000 aged Medicare beneficiaries had declined to 2,672, from
3,846 in 1982; see “Medicare/Medicaid Statistical Supplement,
2000,” Health Care Financing Review (June 2001), Table 23.
52 ISSUES IN DESIGNING A PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT FOR MEDICARE
able) than would people who tended to take older drugs.
Accounting for various characteristics of the patient and
the condition for which a drug was prescribed, use of and
expenditures for all other health care services were lower
when newer drugs were prescribed than when older drugs
were prescribed. The savings, especially in hospital costs,
were substantially larger than the extra costs associated
with using newer drugs. 
 
The study did not account for hospital admissions or
other health care that might have resulted from adverse
drug events, because those admissions would often be for
conditions not related to the purpose of the drug. (For
example, an admission for liver failure resulting from
long-term use of a cardiovascular drug would not be
counted.)  Thus, the study did not fully test whether cost
savings from newer drugs outweighed cost burdens from
adverse drug events. There are other technical questions
about the methods used in the study. Nevertheless, the
magnitude of the net savings estimated by Lichtenberg
suggests that, on balance, patients who took newer drugs
were likely to spend less on other kinds of medical care.
